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East Timor resolution 
adQpted by UN 
The UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimt11a-
tion and Protection of MJnqrit~es has this year adop-
ted a .. resolu.tion on ht}man rights viol~tions ip. East 
Timor. Th)s reverses a decision last year when a draft 
resolution was defeated by a procedural 'no-action' 
move that was passed by 10 votes to nine with five 
abi:Jtentions. The resolution this year w.as 1;idopt~d by 
12 votes to 9 with three abstentions: it Wf;l.S c<:>-spon,.. 
sored by five Sub~Commission members: Erica""'lrene 
Daes (Greece), Asbjorn Eide (Norway), Ribot Hatano 
(Japan), Claire Palley WK) and Hector Fix Zamudio 
{Mexico). 
The adoption of this resolution re-opens the pos-
sibility of raising East Timor at the Human Rights 
Commission next February. The last time the Commis-
sion adopted a . resolution on East Timor was in 1983. 
At.its 1985 session, the Commission decided, in private 
session, that East Timar wa.s no longer under its 
consideration. The reasons f6r this she.meless decision 
and the voting have never been ma.de public. 
The Sub-Commission, known also as the Human 
Rights Sub-9ommission, is composed ot.26 experts and 
meets yearly to prepare , the agenda · of the UN Com-
mission on Human Rights meeting in February-March. 
The resb lution was ~dopted this year Jn t.he face of 
intense lobbying from the Indonesian mission in 
Gerieva; on' most days, as the voting drew near. there 
were atleast teri diplomats constantly present, in a 
desperate attempt to prevent the UN body from taking 
a decision about 'East Tlmor. The Indonesian Foreign 
Ministl'y is also known to have exerted pressure on 
the governments of several of the experts from 
African and Asian countries to instruct 'their' experts 
to V()teagain.sttheresolution. Ih fa.et, the experts are 
supposed to be independent of their governments 
though several are. diplomats or government oftici8.ls 
and he.nee vulnerable to pressure. 
BesidE)$ the submissions. from Jan-Erik Forsberg of 
Sweden, East Timorese refugee Antonio Araujo B;nd 
Jusfiq Ha.sljar1 repprted . elsewher~ in ••• t}lis Bulletin, 
Luisa pereira <;,f the .Lisbon-based Cornmissio~ for th.e 
Rights of.. the Maubere .. People, speaking for Pax 
Romana, referred t() A,mnesty .rnternational'.s most 
recent sta.ternent on human rights abuses. at tbe UN 
DecoloI1isation CoJl1mittee. She stressed . the s.ignifi-
cance qf Bishop Belo's call to theUN for a referE)ndum 
and quoted f .J;om a .letter jµst received fro.m the 
clergy in Ea.st Timor, fully supporting the Bishop's 
call. [See elsewhere for a fuller report of this state-
ment.] 
s~~t ballot 
In a move to . protect expert-members .from t}l.e 
prying eye of governments s,n,d give them the fr~edom 
to vote according to conscience regardless of instruc-
tions from home, the Sub-Commission adopted a 
decision to conduct all resolu~ions critical of g9vez-
nments (these are . resolutions under I.tem 6 .. of J~e 
agepda) by sec.i;-et ballot. .The outrageous pressure 
exerted on experts by Indonesia last year to sabotage 
the East Tiroor resolution [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 89, 
October 1988, page 13] was a major factor for this 
move. As the member from Norway, Asbjorn Eide, said 
without naming an;Y country, "pressµre from govern-
ments la.st year came close to being contempt of 
court''.• 
/>.~ the vo~e was taken. ii) secret, t.he bre~down ot ... 
voting on the East Timor resol\ltfon is .not. known • ., 
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However, contact with the experts in Geneva leads us 
to believe that all the West European members and 
three or four ot the Latin American members including 
the member trom Argentina supported the resolution. 
The Argentinean expert, Leandro Despouy, was par-
ticularly supportive during lobbying; he took the 
reverse position to that of his alternate, Maria Teresa 
Flores, who voted for no action on East Timor lasf 
year. The member from Japan was a. co-sponsor, while 
the member from Algeria is thought to have voted · in 
favour, plus one or two other members from Third 
World countries. The Soviet member almost certainly 
abstained {he is not in. favour of the Sub-Commission 
taking any country-oriented resolutions except on 
non-controversial issues like South Africa and the 
Palestinians). Other East European members, the 
Chinese member (himself a target because he a.nq his 
government strongly ref.listed any move to condemn 
China for the Tienanmen massacres} also certainly 
voted against, along with the member from Cuba. 
Speaking most vehemently against the resolution 
was the Sub-Commission member from Somalia, Aidid 
Abdillahi Ilkahanaf, who attacked it as a "manoeuvre 
by the Portuguese Government to uphold its fictitious 
role as the administering power of Es.st Tlmor". He 
made no attempt to question the operative clauses oi' 
the resolution concerning human rights violations. Al-
though last year, llkaha:naf initiated the 'no-action' 
. U~ ~esolu~ton . on East;. Timor 
·' The Sub-Commission .on Prevention. of Dis<:rimination 
and Protection. or Millorltle~, · _ . · .. 
Guided by · the 1'.rnivers8.I Declaration ot Hu.man 
·. rughta, . the .International Oov.enAAt. on . Civil . and 
. Politica.1 Rights and .tJ'e universally accepted rules of 
lnter.Q~.tionat' humanitanan law, .' · 
· Rec&Uing its · 'resolutions · 1982/20 'of 8 ·· Septetn:b~r 
1982, , i983/26 of 6 . September 1983, 1984/24 of 29 Augus~" 19$4 and 19~7/i3 of 2 Sept.ember :1987 :·con-
cerning the situatio~ .In East Timor, · ' 
Considering the repeated fillegations that the people 
· ot Ji;ut · Ti~r ~on.tinue to be ~til;ijec~ed . to . gt-ass 
ylolations of human rights, 
·1. ·'W'elcomea . the actions taken ~y the Secretary-
General regarding Ea,s~. Tirno,r, ; 
2. . ' : a,queilte the .secretary-General to coptmue. his 
etfo:rts to encourag.;t all parties coneerned> !that; is, the 
Administer~:fll Powe;, the ltidonesis.n GOvernment and 
repl'esentatlves ot the Eas.t .Timorese ~ple, ~co­
operate fully in order to ~hieve '- dur~ble solution, 
ta.kt~~ full ac;~un:t of the l'fghUJ'. and wishes- ot the 
peopte at East Timor. ·· · 
. ' 
3. Takes iiot,e. ot ·tJie lette~ f~om Bi•hop Carlos'~Upe 
Ximenes Belo, dated 6 Febryary J.989 (A/Ad.109"/991) . 
addressed to the $ecre~-Geperal c8lling for a 
relerenduin 'In. Eaaf TJmor. 
Luisa Teotonio Pereira of the .Commission for the 
Rights of the Kaubere People, addressing the UN Sub-
coaaission in Geneva. Left, Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL. 
procedure, he did not do so this year, making it 
possible for the Sub-Commission to take a stand. 
SuppOrt troa man7 NGOa 
A statement signed by representatives of eighteen 
NOGs attending the Sub-Commission was circulated to 
all Sub-Commission members. It expressed regret that 
the Sub-Commission failed at its 40th session Jast year 
to adopt a resolution on East Timor: ''In the light ot 
new, up-to-date information made available to thell 
Sub-Commission at its present session, we appeal to., 
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the members to pay proper regard to the aitus.tton in 
East Timor and request the Commission on Human 
Rights to keep the matter under constant review." 
The statement was supported by: International 
Commission of Jutists; Human Righta ·: !dvoc~tes; 
Inte:rnatio.nal MoveDient for Fraternal /Union among 
Races and Peoples; . International Ae~iatlon of 
Educators for World Peace; ~ Habitat Int:(,;rnational 
Coalition; International Organisation for the' Elimina-
tion o! all Forms of Racial Discrimination; Pa.x Christi 
International; Internationtll .Federation !or the Protec-
tion of ,the Rights, Linguistic, Religious, Ethnic and 
EAST Tl MOR 
Other Minorf ties; International League for the Right& 
.and Liberation of Peoples; Pax Romana.; Minority 
Rights Group; Liberation; .Women's International 
League lot- Peace rand F;reedom; World Student Chrl~­
tian Federation; World ·· University ServiCe; Ihtern~­
ttonal Commission of Health Professional.a; Internation-
al League !or Human Rights; and Indigenous Wotld 
Association.* 
''Indescribable torture'' in East Timor 
'4ntonio Maria de Araujo with his mother, his wife and their fourteen childreh, left Dili for 
Lisbon at the end of April this' yea.r, after waiting ten years for permission to leave East Timor. 
He testified before the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission at its session in August this year. 
Araujo is a trained nurse. After the Indonesian 
invasion, he told the ,Sub-Com!Jlission, he . worked at 
the radiology department of Dili General Hospital 
which had been ts.ken over . by the Indonesian a:rmy. 
All . Timorese patientlil .were removed and placed . in a 
clink :outaide the hospital. DyrinS tP,e eleven months 
he. worked at the military .hospital, he was detained 
three time~ .!or questioning, i(lterr~ga.ted a.iid each 
time subjected to torture. On the third occasion, he 
was given electric shoc;ks by .a doctor of . the red:-
.. berets paras brigade. ·· · · 
On 8 November 1976 he was ar.rested by Captain 
!farigan a.nd. J~E!ld first by the Military . Police th~n 
dets.ine.d at. Comarca P,risc;m for a total .of ~9 months. 
"The methods of physical and moral torture which I 
witnessed .were ipdescribable. The torturers .competed 
with each other in their zeal to inflict torture.~· 
After .his :release . from prison, he was •appointed 
·heacL of., administration. at the Health Depar:tµient, ·but 
was again arrested in June ,1.980 . after resjsts.nce 
fighters attacked radio and televlslon installations on 
the out.sJdrti,; of Dili• On thiE; occasion, he was held for 
43 days with, many others a.nd was this time beaten by 
a Ca.p~iQ , Zamira.d. Again he witneased extraordinary 
acts of sadism. "I shall not describe here the horrify-
ing scenes, the sexual abuse and acts of sodomy I 
witnessed, but these scenes will be engraved in my 
memory and those of many of my .. fellow citizens for 
ever. The Indones.iani; or9.e'r us to call them 'Bapak' 
or 'Father', but our . sentiment~ towards therir a.re 
quite the reverse." 
He was expelled from the civil service after being 
.rele~ed, so got a.n . admini!'>tra.tive job at .the Saint 
Jose School in Dili, the onl:Y diocesan ~chool that has 
preserved a deg~ee Qf autonomy f~om i~donesia. ' 
()peninff up changes no~c tor . Timoreae 
Araujo sa.id. that since the. 'opening up' o~ East Timor) 
only a few .. tout'ists have been able to visit, nqt human 
rights organisations like Amnesty, Freedom ()f move-
ment for Tirnorese is still very restricted; .Timorese in 
Dili who want to vJsn nearby Ma.n~tuto are prevented 
from doing so if t,hey have no ldentification papers. 
In April, 8 group of public employees at the Educ~tion 
Department wa·nting to go to Baucau were not only 
prevented from doing so but were subjecte_d to 
col"poral punishment. 
The church is also s victim of repression. Priests 
must report to the rpilittµ-y comman.ders aboqt the 
contents .. of their .sermons. The •Catholic Scout.s Mow~­
ment~ .of which I was a .leader, was banned frolll 
wearing its badges whe~ oµr chyrch was conseo:ra~d,. 
Some persp,ns arrested in Qctober and November latit 
year were .reJeafied on condition tflat they spy"on the 
pl"iests 8.IJ.d parish officit!ls. 
Araujo aiSo spoke about conditions in the country-
side where whole populations were displaced and 
forced to live in 'strategic village~' under i:itrict army 
surveillanc;e~ Villagers are obliged to · mount guard 
against the Timorese resistance and cannot move ·more 
than five kilometres outside the 'village perimeters, 
preventing tl'~em trom tilling .the fields. ' ' · 
In conclusion, Araujo sa.id: · 
Your .inditference or your si]en,ce will . oontribute 
to the physical, cultural and moral e.ic~ei;minat1on of a 
small people, simply beqspse they have been deni,ed 
the right to exercise their right - to their liberty and 
independence.* ·· · · ' 
Antonio Maria de 
Araujo, left, 
photographed tn 
1978 Wi·th his 
father when they 
were both being 
held without trial 
in COl!lllrca Prison, 
Dili. His father 
was a · rretilin 
activist in suai and had coiae to Dili on 6 Decellber 
1975. the day before the Indonesian inva,sion. He apent 
two. and a half years in prison. He died in 1986. 
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East Timor at the 
UN Decolonisation Committee 
As in previous years, representath·es of n variet.v of 
organisations and a number of individuals petitioned 
the UN Decolonisation Committee 011 the question of 
East Timar. Particularl.v stl"iking was the appearance 
of seven pa.rliamentarians. from Portugal, Canada, 
Japan and the UK. 
The following are brief summaries of all the peti-
tions. We hope iTJ subsequent issues to . more full,v 
summarise of. some of the petitions. 
Canadian MP, David Kilgour, from the governing 
Conservative Party and the first Canadian parliamen-
tarian ever · to · testify, · called events in East Timor 
"the hidden holocaust". Alexander George, for TAPOL, 
said nothing has changed as East Timar remains 
under Indonesian occupation. Tamako Nakanishi, a 
Japanese MP, speaking for the· Japanese Diet Forum on 
East Timor, regretted that East Timor representatives 
were not included in the UN Secretary-General's 
consultations with parties concerned with the issue. 
Geoi'trey Robinson, for Amnesty International, said 
reports of serious violations, including mass arrests, 
torture, extrajudicia.l executions and disappearances, 
had been received recently. Ann Clwyd, a British MP, 
speaking for Parliamentarians for East Timar, spoke 
about her experiences of an official visit · to East 
Timer in March this year (for details, see her inter-
view in TAPOL Bulletin, No 93, June 1989] and urged 
the Committee to consider conditions under which a 
plebiscite in East 'l'imor should be held. Pedro Pinto 
Leite, for the Dutch Indonesia Committee, the X min 
Y Foundation and the Dutch East Timor Group said 
Indonesia's so-called development of East Timor was 
just an attempt to consolidate .its hegemony and 
provide a cover for colonial exploitation. · 
Maria Luis Franca de Oliviera, International Catholic 
Movement of Pax Christi, spoke about Bishop Belo's 
letter to the UN Secretary-General which he had 
written beCQ.u~e, .after 14 years of Indonesian occupa-
tion, the situa.tion in East Tlmor remained intolerable. 
Bishop Alolstus Soma of the Japanese catholic Council 
for J~stice and Peace said the. tragedy of E~st Timor 
was a clear case of genocide; he presented a state-
ment signed by 1,250 cardinals, archbishops, bishops, 
priests, .sisters and the faithful, expressing s9lid~rity 
with the people of East Timor. Michel Robert, French 
Association of Solidarity with East Timar condemned 
the UN for giving Suharto its Population Award, 
considering the huge. loi:;s of life ip East Timor since 
the Indopesian invasipn. ·" > 
Portuguese MP, Jose Pacheco Pereira reiterated his 
country's special role to guarant~r Ee.at T.imor's right 
to self-determination, under Portuguese and interna-
tional supervision. Portuguese MP, Maria Manuela 
Agular condemned Indonesia's attempt to seal Ea.st 
Timor off and called for urgent action ·t? save the 
Timorese people and their cultural identity. Kiyoko 
Furusawa, Japanese Free East Timor Coalition focused 
on protecting the reproductive rights of Timorese 
women. 
Paulo Pires, UniOn· for a Democratic Timor welcomed 
the many recent international condemnations of human 
rights violations in &\st Timor. Ela.lne . Briere, East 
Timo.r Alert Network, Canada, said Indonesian aggres-
sion in East Timar must not be allowed to succeed and 
criticised the Canadian government for ignoring 
Indonesian brutalities to pursue its market-oriented 
agenda in Indonesia. Jose Luis . Guterres of Fretilin 
said Fretilin was ready to take part in a referendum 
under UN auspices a'nd would respect Indonesia's 
territOrial integrity and stability in the region. 
Sidney Jones, Asia Watc.h criticised the UN Secretar-
iat's Working Paper tor giving the erroneous impres-
sion that no ki11ings have occurred . in East Timor. 
Adriano Aleves Moreira, a Portuguese MP,t condernned 
Indonesian genocide. East Timor should revert to 
Portuguese administration . as . a > step • towards . self-
determination; resistance forces should take part in 
negotiations to this · end. Antonio Jose Monteiro Vidlgal 
Amaro, another Portuguese MP said th~ climate of 
terror in East Timar had intensified recently,* 
Princen prevented from testifying at UN 
lndone~ia's leading human rights activist> Haji J.C. 
Princen, director of the Jakarta-based Institute for 
the Defence of Human Rights> was refused an exit 
permit to leave Indonesia . to attend the UN Human 
Rights Sub-Commission in Geneva. He was mandated 
by the Regional Council on Human Right1:1 in Asia to 
speak at the Sub-Commission on two issues, the 
massacre of vtllagers in Talang Sari, Lampung Prov-
ince, South Sumatra on 7 February 1989, and the 
deteriorating human rights situation in East Timor. 
Princen is the first Indonesian ever to have made an 
attempt to testify against Indonesia. at the UN on its 
human rights record. 
More than twenty non-governmental organisations 
attending the Sub-Commission meeting, including the 
Anti-Slavery Society and the International Commissi6n 
of Jurists, signed a statement addressed to the In-
donesian government protesting that Princen was 
prevented from testifying in Geneva. 
The Regions.I Council mandated Jusfiq Hadjar to 
attend the Sub-Commission to deliver the testimony on 
Princen's behalf. 'Jusfiq said: "The Indonesian autho-
rities have frequently refused him an exit visa., which 
means that his situation is no different from about 
one-and-a-half million ex-political prisoners, as well 
as many senior politicians who are members of the 
group · ot dissidents ·known as the . Petition-of-50. 
These people have never been charged or brought to 
trial, no judge has passed any verdict depriving them 
ot the right to leave the country, yet they, like Mr 
Princen> suffer the same fate."* 
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Pope. to visit East Timor 
Tht; C~thoUc church in East Tfmoi; faces serious problems •. Bishop Belo's call for a referendum 
ts still reverberating, The Pope is to. make a. highl.v controversial visit to East Timor this 
month. And now Belo is openl.v hinting that he ma;v soon be removed from his post as head of 
the Catholic church. .· 
It has been confirmed .that Pope J9hn ·Paul Will visit 
East Timor on 12 October •. Although a nation like the 
East Timorese, 80 per cent Catholib, would be expected 
to welcome the Pope, they hav~ many misgiVlngs a.bout 
this vis-it. 
Formallyjthe Vatican does not recogniSe Indonesia's 
annexation of the territory and has ma.de it clear th.at 
its stand is determined by the UN which still recog-
nises Portugal as the admini1;tering power. Hence the 
diocese of Dill has not been incorporated into the 
Indonesian diocese; The Vatfcim ha.s not· appointed a 
bishop of I'liU; running the diocese direct from Rome, 
with the help of an apostolic administrator; a position 
occupied by Mgr :c:;axlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, who was 
ordained Bishop o.f Lorellm> (a diocese in Italy) last 
year. 
Bishop Belo 
Until recently, a papal visit to Indonesia h.ad been 
ruled out because of East Timor, Hence it came as a 
great surprtse to .. learn t?~rlie~ thi.s . ~ear that Pope 
John Paul would include Indonesia in a trip to the Far 
East, t'C.llowing a visit fo South . Korea to attend the 
Eucharist conference. The VS.t.ican app•arently insisted 
that the Po}>e would. not go fo Indonesia unless . East 
Timor was pn th~ itinerary. It .was not difficult for 
Ja.ka~ta to comply, provided the visit. 'WBS arranged in 
such a wa.Y' aS to aUow Ind~mesie. to interpret it as 
legitimation by the Vatican of its claim to East Timor. 
This it has already done in several statements to UN 
bodies this summer. 
The only way t.Q . ~void such.an interpreta.tionwould 
have been for the Vatican tQ make it clear that the 
Pope would vi~it Indonesia and East Titnor, or still 
better t0.visit E.astTimor ·attercompletfng·his itinera-
ry in Indonesia; But now, the Vatican has officially 
announced the Pope's itinerary which does not even 
mention East Timor separately from Indonesia. Per-
haps, the Pope plans to couch his message duri11g the 
mass lp East Tipior in terms . whic.h unmistakably 
recognise tpe special rights . of the people .. of East 
Timor, rendering Indonesia's 'victory' less .than total. 
Be that as it may, the Vatican is venturing along a 
dangerous path, betraying the . East Timorese and 
assisting Jakarta in its efforts to seal their fate 
diplomatically, 
This is all the more reprehensible since Bishop Belo 
has made a clarion call for the UN ·to listen to the 
wishes of his people by mea)'ls of a referendum. 
Aµst:nlian journiillsts .. tntetyle"f B~lo 
Lin<isay Murdoch of The Age; Melbourne, visited East 
Thnor in late August, along ·with ·· a journalist from 
Australian Associated r>ress. They interviewe.d.ilUshop 
Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the head of the Catholic 
Church, who reiterated his demand for a referendum, 
repeating the statement · in his '. 6 February Jetter .. to 
the. UN Secretary-General that the Timorese people 
"was dying every day". He spoke out 
because of my experience of seeing people. suffering 
without a voice to speak openly, frankly and freely. 
P1•Jests and bishops can speak but the ordinary 
people cannot speak, If they do, they fsce interroga-
tion or torture. The people are suffering mainly 
psyche>logical and political pressure •. Everybody, .. is 
obliged to thin_k and do according ,ti;) the I.n.d.~ll~~fan 
political s.vstem .... that the.v are an integr8.J part of 
Indonesia and that there is no other way. · 
The journalists •observed that ~ishop .Sefo's house 
was guarded by two 'plainclothes mili~ry of,fic$rs and 
the Bishop confirmecf fl-:iat he .wasconstantly watche'd. 
J\.sked what he wanted Pope JQhn Paul to say .during 
his brief visit to :Ells.t Timor)!l Oct;ober, Bish()P Belo 
said: "According to .Jlle, it ia better to make soipe 
statement about human rfahts ·and underline again 
respect for the historic~l, . . religJous · and cultural 
identity of the people of ~st Timer." • 
Foman ~ ~t"e·l.l~ fro1a. Mlifnac. 
Belo said Indonesia ... had .stOpped at lea.St 'eight 
foreign Catholic ~issi~naries ... from entering .East 
Timor. A senior army qfficer later .denie<l this, thou$h 
admitted that their documents "were bein~proees~ep" 
which took time .... Bu.f-..if. lie (the .Bishop) aske<:l for 
priests from .another Indol\esia.n province, it would be 
very easy." [Lindsay Murdocl;\ in 'J'he,A.,e, 28 August, 
and AAP, Jn Sydney Mornin~ Herald, 2ftAugust 19~9. 
Bishop Belo to be mov•d! 
Bishop Belo told anqthe~ journfllis~, 'Alain Be>e,Qion of 
AFP, who visited Dili in early September, that he may 
not remain in East Timar long beyond the Pope's visit 
(in October); he was. ".at the dispos!'fl of the Vatican 
and ready to leave for South America or somewhere ll 
else". As Boebion recalls, Belo•s predecessor, Mgr., 
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Martinho da Costa Lopes, who accused the armed 
forces of engaging in torture and carrying out 
arbitrary arrests, was forced to re.sign .in .. 1982 and 
now lives in Portugal. 
Boebion also reported that the army is using the 
Pope's visit to carry out a security sweep. Informed 
sources told him that several dozen people suspected 
of links with the armed resistance were arrested in 
May, June · and July this year. While the governor 
admitted there had been 27 arrests in connection with 
the Pope's visit, Bishop told him at least 55 people 
had been arrested "to prevent a possible insurrec-
tion". He &dded: "We are only e.ware of some cases 
because the families of many of those arrested are 
scared to confide in us. People know that if they come 
to see the bishop, they will have problems.'' f AFP, 5 
September 1989] 
Tlmoreae clergy aupport 'Belo•a referendum call 
Confoanding senior Indonesian officials backed by 
Mgr Canalini, the Vatican's ambassador in J&karta, 
who claim that Bishop Belo, Apostolic Administrator, 
spoke purely as an individual when he called for a 
referendum in February 19S9, the clergy ' of Timar 
issued a statement in July insisting that the Church 
is entitled to have its say on a variety of ·human 
situations in which the dignity of · individuals and 
society is at stake. "We are not requesting the right 
to speak, we are requesting the right to be heard." 
They said that the Bishop "spoke on his own behalf 
and as head of the Timorese church ... in complete 
accord with church doctrine and with recent pontifi-
cal teachings". 
The clergy of Dili reject those pernicious views and 
suggestions which go against the spirit snd doctrine 
o( the Church as manifested by certain ecclesiastical 
personalities snd bY those who h~Ve been manipu-
lated. The Bishop is the representative of the Church, 
Recently published 
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theologically, juridicall,v and ecclesiasticslly, and 
when he speaks in that cape.city, in accordance with 
the Church snd in line with the feelings of the clergy 
and of the people, he acts with an authority thst muet 
be respec.ted and taken into account. 
The clergy said they had not signed their names on 
the statement in order to be able to continue to work 
at the side of our people. The document was made 
public by the Lisbon-based organisation, Peace is 
Possible in East Timor which added .tpat it was 
obtained through Catholic Church channels whose 
authenticity is beyond question. 
Cbrlatian aoliderlty 
The Fifth Christian Consultation on East Timor, held 
in Brussels from 5 ..,. 9 September 1989 and attended 
by some thirty Christian organisations from Belgium, 
France, West Ger~a.ny, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Switzerl.ci,nd and tlie UJ{, stqdied the humao .rights 
situation in East Timor. It took note in particular of 
the call by · Bishop Belo, supported by the Timorese 
clergy, for a referendum in East Timor. 
With regard to the Pope's visit to . East Timor, it 
expressed concern that, though l~gitiinate from a 
pastoral point of . view,. the vii;it will be iused by the 
Indonesian government for political ends. The Consul-
tation z:ecalled the<Pope's position from 1984 onwards 
when he told two Indonesian ambassa.dprs of his hope 
that "the ethnic, religious and .cultural' identity of the 
people will .receive ·special attentipn". 
The Consultation deplored the fact that the Pope's 
visit has been prepared by Indonesian political and 
religious authorities without consulting the Timorese 
clergy and faithful. A~ . a •result, the language of 
Timor's people, Tetum is unlikely to be used in the 
mass which the Pope will . celehl:ate, and the visit 
itself will la.st a few hours; too short to permit him or 
his numerous advisers, ·or the press corps, to inform 
themselves about the situation in the territory. 
It should also be .noted that at Taci-Tolu, t~e site 
chosen for celebrating . the eucharist, thousands of 
Timorese were executed by Indonesian soldiers. 
It was the hope of the Gonsultation tp,13.t the Pope 
would encourage the organisers of his tour to. take 
more notice of the wishes of the Tilllorese Church and 
visit Enst Timor after his viSft to Indonesia. The Pope 
should respond to the cry of the Timoi:ese people, 
remembering the call to justice , contained in the 
message of the Gospel. 
The Consultation .sent a message of solidarity to Mgr 
Belo and the clergy of E;ast Timor and appealed to all 
those who accompany. John Paul II on piS pastoral 
visit to .. ~ast Ti!'nor to .be{lt hi mind the tra~ic sltua-
tion .of the Timorese people and the manfpufa.tive use 
which the Indonesian authorities will almost certain 
make of this occasion. 
Mass ·t.p. be ~lebrat;ed in lndonesi"'1l? 
Apart . from these problems, tpere . is the brevity of 
the . Pope's half-hour vi.sit to Dili t<l. meet privately 
with .the local clergy .and consecrate tile cathedral 
Qpene~ .. b;v President S4,hi1rto last. No.vem})~r.. '!;his 
cathedral is 1.mpopular with Timores~ beGa.t1se it was 
quilt with Indonesi.~n f1,1pds and military sµpport. 
As for the)anguage of the mass, some sources $8.Y 
tha!,, f,() be 'politica.HY neutral', the Pope may us~ 
Latin for the general part or the mass. The Human 
Rights Office of AustraHa.n CouncU for Overseas• Aid 
says .. however all the masses in . lnd.~l)esia anq'ir(East 
Timor will be con.ducted Indonesian. · 
The •Jn.dqnesian church is urging the Pope to kiss 
the . groun4 only in Jakarta and not . Jn East Timar.* 
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Glasnost, Suharto style 
Inspired by democratic openings in some parts of the 
world, several Indonesi~n OJ>positionfsts and intellec-
tuals have tried to make this global trend an issue in 
Indonesia. Since June . keterbukaan (opening-up) has 
been front-,page news, with statements by well-known 
public figures and politjcal commentators. So, how has 
glasnost Indonesi8.-sty1e fared? 
Keterbukaan ln the tndoneldan context. 
~t all started with the now infamous remark in Suhar-
tp's ~Ut<:?bfo~ .raphy that he ini~ht .. step down . in 1993 
becau'se of old , .age. Althougll noboqy who knows 
anything about Indon~H~ian J.>Olitics tak~s Suharto's 
statement seriously~ it was used by his opponents to 
launeh a succession debate and gradually the keter-
bukaan theme started grabbing the headlines, 
The first salvo was fired :in Parliament (DPR), 
usually one of the most boring places in the ·republic. 
The , Second Commission headed by Major-General 
Samsuddin invited bigshots like General. Soemitro and 
General Mur.diono to air their views on keterbukaan. 
Soemitro, regarded in the early 1970s as Indonesia's 
second most powerful man, propagate.d a more liberal 
system in preparation for the post-Suharto period. 
This retired ·general, creator of Buru prison-island, 
now promotes .. himself as a champion of democracy. 
Soemitro assumes that Suharto:willstep down in 1993. 
He appealed to the DPR to use its legislative powers 
to control the government. He said the time was ripe 
for keterbuka.an and proposed that opposing views 
should be allowed to exist, and decisions taken by, 
voting. 
Soemitro's support for voting would mean rejecting 
the Javanese concept of musyawarah. Though desc-
ribed as consensus, in reality musyawarah means that 
dechdons are imposed fri;>m above and talten unani-
mously, Musyawara.l) pas been the cornerstone of 
Indonesian politics since the Sukarno era when he 
installed the authoritarian <;;uided Democracy in 1959. 
He ditched the western principle of majority decision-
making and .. replaced it with mu11yawa.rah, allegedly 
unearthed from lndonesia's own traditions. When 
Suharto;; took . over, the musyawarah principle was 
boosted. Now Soemitro says he favours the voting 
system, restoring majority decision..,.making and im-
plicitly advocating the existence of an opposition. 
There is no pla,ce for minority i;>pinion in the cor-
poratist Pancasila model of the Orde Baru. 
The keterbukaan discussion became more interest-
ing when historian Dr Onghokham joined in, arguing 
that the existence ot an opposition is only natural 
and the ban on opposition or the right .to differ 
weakens the Indonesian people. [Media Indonesia, 19 
August 1989] Other academics like MT Arifin and Ariet 
Budiman have discussed the structural imbalance of 
power. The rulers possess all the power while the 
people lack. political power. Keterbukaa.n, Arief Budi-
man argues, means balancing the bargaininil t>Ower of 
the . people and the government. According to Ari!in, 
all affairs in society are in the hands of bureaucrats 
in coalition with politicians. [ Kedaulatan Rakyat, 30 
July 1989]. 
For a brief moment it seemed that a Parisian or 
Prague spring was blossoming in Indonesia but then 
came the response from Sttharto and his men. 
The empire atrikea back 
In July, President Suharto and ABRI commander 
General Try Sutrisno answered the critics to set 
things straigh~. One Sunday afternoon in Bali on 23 
July, Suharto · laid down the guidelines for political 
openness which must be obeyeq by all Indonesians: 
* There is no freeqom without limits. Freedom of 
expression should be guided by sound and logical 
rational thinking. 
* The state ideology Pancasila, the 1946 · Cotistitution 
and the GBHN (the Broad Outlines of State Policy) are 
the guiding principles for anybody wanting to pre• 
sent ideas ln the context of political openness. 
* Openness in presenting views or proposals should 
be · linked with the public interest. People should 
therefore think carefully before expressing thoughts 
in public. Do not speak up only to discover later that 
these ideas are controversial in the light of the 
guiding principles. 
* National unity should not be endangered by the 
free presentation <?f ideas. There should be an aware-
ness of the need to avoid trying to ignite tribal, 
racial, and religious sensitivities, and sensitivity 
regarding differing levels of public welfare~ If 
freedom of speeeh can cause national disintegration, 
it would be better to control it. (Jak(;lrta Post, 25 July 
1989). 
Suharto had become the abortionist of Indonesian 
glasnost. Moreover, when elaborating the four guide-
lines, he was not the well-poised Javanese gentleman; 
he wa.s edgy and · bad-tempered. Indeed, political 
observers note that, lately, he has frequently suf..,. 
fered from fits of anger. 
A few days earlier Commander Try Sutrisno spent 
four hours in Parliament explaining that. keterbukaan 
is nothing new, it llas exist.ed all the time, regulated 
in the military doctrine ()f 1974. He explained that the 
armed forces seminar in 1974 accepted a doctrine 
defining the Indonesian state as a negara kekeluar-
gaan (state based 'i:m the family principle). Open 
democracy has · existed in the villages since · the ·start 
of the republic. (Kompas, 20 July 1989). Whether or 
not he realises it, the ABRI commander1s corporatist, 
paternalistic model is very close tb Hitler's faadst 
concept. 
Those "1ho thought they could take keterbukas.n 
seriously were soon to feel the consequences. General 
Soemitro who has a variety of business interests was 
suddenly accused of grabbing land for a mushroom 
factory. General .Samsuddin, who had invited him t;oll 
ParUament, was replaced as chair pfCommisB:ion II. As., 
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Arief Budiman had warned earlier, keterbukaan is lip 
servfoet a safety-valve foi: critics. Everyt~ing de-
pends on what is happening in the higher echelons 
of the regime. · 
Conf'llcta at the top 
The Rs.pat fimpinap ABRI (Rs.pim ABRI) or .. Abri's 
ComI111µ1ders Call, had Jts yearly gathering · in mid 
August. T:his .a.nnµal: eyent is 1ls1.tally regarded 4~ a 
major politict;i.1 . event wpen the ABRI leadership 
together with .. the regional commanderi;i work out 
strategy for t})e coming year. This year's g~thering, 
held for the. :J:ir.st time in ABRits new headqu,fu'~ers in 
Cilangkap, took place as usual behind closed .doors. 
Only the tip of the iceberg emer~ed . 'V,hen Try Sutris-
no assured .the President, in a repprt-back audience, 
that the ranks would ''focus efforts. on ensuring the 
continuity · ot the national leadership of the New 
Order". This has been given two jnte:rPretations. 01,le 
suggest~ that Suharto stil~ enjoys the support of the 
AJ:!RI leader~hip ap.d that the arIJled forces will ba.Qk 
him .for .a six~h ter?ll; almost into. the next cen~ury. 
The other suggests that toda,y'a ABRI leadei:s !iave 
reached .a consens\ls .. for Suh¥"t? to lea\Te of~i<;e in 
1993, to be replaced by somebody from their own 
ranks. But as everyone knowfil, Jhis is largely .specu-
lative, as< the generals ~em~~ ti,ghklipped. , , 
Try Sutrisno also said that the . armeci forces will 
focus .strongly on sosppl and intel whi<;:h means they 
are expecting mor.e sociP,l unrest. 'I'he .filimPle message 
is tho!l.t there will be even mor~ surveillance< and 
oppression, A series ~f subversive trials .in ,Jay~pura., 
Lampung1 . .. Sumbawa, .. Jakarta a.rid Bandupg · · have 
star~d and the defenciants .can elf;pect heavy senten.,. 
ces to set. an example. · (See . several. trial r .epo.rts 
elsewhere jn th.is Bulletip..) 
Anothet real}ty is that the .AllitI top brass .often 
contradict each other and rumou:r:;s . persist. . ot .. a 
drastic reshuffle of the ABRI leadership. Both Defence 
Mii;Uster . Ben11y .. Murdani and Try .S\ttrisno can be 
e]!:pected to . pl~y pivotal roles in the coming months. 
Su~·· stern warnina 
With military leadei-s a.PP1;'8.J:'.ing .more . . an.d more at 
cross purposes with each other, Suharto Judged the 
time had come ·for a harsh warning. on the plane 
returning from a state visit to Moscow, he deClared 
angrily: "I can be replace .. <lany .tiIJ1e if it's. Pf c~n­
stit\l~ional me~ns. If i:i'o.~, I'll clobber. them ( digebuk), 
whoever they are, generals , or. politicians" • • This 
unusually· blu,nt language . is ?"emjniscent of l'lis in-
famous March 1980 Cijantun:S .~P~~ch, -wtien ,h~ . str.µck 
back at his toes within ABRI~ .Speaking 9ff the. cuff, 
Suharto can be muc}l fr~tJ~~r t.h~n .. on formal oc-
BAKORSTANAS STEPS IN 
Jn the face of growing intransigence .on the c,am-
puses (see pa,ge 10), the .armed forces are. Soing into 
act.ion against .the students. on. ~O August,,.J:3a~orstan;­
as, the seqqrity agency "(hich replaced J{c;>Pka111tibJa,st 
year hlJ,t , without . its. sweeping ... powe,rs eJi:cep~ in 
emer~e.nc.ies, instructeg it.a .regi9nal . agepcies to. ta,ke 
ac~ion aga~nst. c,l!'!m9nst.rations and protest~ •.. General 
Try Sutdsno, 'chair' of Bakorstanas, ordered .them to 
take "r;a:t>~d, approP,riate and com.J>rehensiv~ action · to 
deal with any unrest". [Suara }'elJ1baruan,, 19/9/89] 
On the day this .. was made public, Gen<mi,l Murdani, 
former Kopkamtib com.mander, nQw Defence .Minister, 
called for greate~ repression by . insisting tha~ stu-
dents who go .on the streets "spouting and protest-
ing" must be · arrested. "If t.helr purpose is to· snarl 
General S.uharto. chatting "'ith his two 11ost trust~ 
generals, Try Sutrisno . (left} and .. Major-~eneral 
Murdiono, shortly befpre tli .. r .. cent ColMlaJlders'c. Call. 
{Photo: Tempo, 19 Ausust 1989] · 
casioris. "What do ~hey want'? Maybe, they want to 
replace me quickly . . That's okay as long as it is dqne 
accoi·ding the Constitution." 
After l;he Cijantung. speech, Su}larto struck .riierci--
lessly at his enemiest ousting them and/ punishing 
soroe·retired' generals by • strangulating their: business 
interests and depriving them of .government orders. 
This< proved so effective that one general literally 
crawled in the dust and publicly begged forgiveness, 
Now .again, retired and active officers are showing 
defiance and again Suharto is retaliating• 
One major 'reason for Suhartb's ·outburst was that 
the army leaders bad convened. their own commanders' 
call wllile he, the 1:ttipreme commander of AB.FU, and 
armed forces colJllllander-in-,chiet Try. Sutrisno,were 
visiting the Kremlin. The army summit also took place 
be.hind ·.·. cfosed ,; .. doors,•• but Suharto loyalists ··• are 
thought to have channelled information to him on his 
way home. 
Glaanoat. but cm11' t~ the .mtar~ 
Indonesian glasnost is only an ,A.BR! phenomenon 
and is out-of-bounds for civiliaJl.S• Generally speak-
ing, splits in army ranks do not come into the open; 
A.BR~ functions as a . compact U?lit vis1a-:ns civilians. 
At this vf!ry t;ime, E;tUdents in Jo~ja. and Bandung are 
expqrtencing the ef.(ects of ABRI c~?sing ranks. But a 
rift ts becoming .&.J>Parent over the succeru.don issue. 
It is not clear where the lines of division ' start and 
end, whether Suharto enjoys enough support for 
another term, whether he is preparing somebo~r i'or 
the ... succession ~r .whether the army top brass ~+e 
detertriined to deqide on the successor themselves'* 
STOP PRESS 
up the traffic and read poetry, there is no alternative 
but to arrest them." He 'Warne.cl people not to c:ome to 
the .students' defence. { rvaspa<ia, .19 September] 
A week later, .. Bak;orstanas was formally a11signe.d . to 
endzsturleht unreal at ITB; [JakaravPost and Kompas, 
29?September) For the first time1 Ba.korstanss is .being 
used operationally to deal with p~Utical unrest~ At the 
same timey. ifive . university rectors, illcluding Wiranto 
Arismunandar oi'>ITB, were sent abroad, leaving the 
way free for the army to a.ssert its <will on the" cam-
puses. EdticationMinister, Fuad Hassan was quoted as 
sayin:g. there was no 'need for "outside intervehtion'' 
in the campuses but he appear1;1 to have been over-
ruled ... 
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Reining in the NGOs 
Lately, Pr~sident $uht\r~ h1.u; been prone to f~e­
ql1el'lt ou,~gurE}ts pf Al"\~er. Critic;~~m of his policies is 
~.1;o~tng, both at. h91lle a.nd tibroiid. Efforts to cle~g up 
his interna.tiona.l image .have failed. · .. , 
His visit to the US to receive the UN Population 
.!\ward wae marre_cj by proteE1t fNm ma.ny ~on-go;ern­
lllent organisations (N'GOs) frqm many parts of . the 
::rorld •• His visit to President B\,ls):i was an pccasion for 
118 members . ~f ·• Congress to raise h)Jma.n rigl,lts 
concerns abot~t East Timor. On 'top of this, Bush and 
US Treasurer Brady reacted coldly to Suharto's pleas 
for help to solve Indonesia's / growing debt burden. 
All this was too much for the usually softspoken and 
well-mannered Javanese general, A leak of the minutes 
of the 5 July cabinet session shows that Suharto was 
in a rage, apcusing Indone1:1~/iri NGOs of c;-eating a .had 
image ~qr >ln~one~)a. Suhart(, Js .. appa:r;enµ~. convinced 
that mounting criticism abroad is due to informa.tioh 
sent by Indonesian NGOs to their counterparts in 
f:ttrope~ the US . and Austre,lia. 
The 't.SM$'~ a special breed ot NOOS 
In the last fift,een years> social, Political an~ relig-
ious activities have shifted from formal bodies like 
parliament or the political parties to new 6rganisa-
tions1 now called Lellib,!J.ga. Swa<Jaya Masyarakat .(J,SM) 
or 'self-relie,nt social institutes'. In the mid s~venties, 
~GOs cons.is,t~d mainly of legal aiq .. bureaus a,nd appro-
priate teqhnolpgy g:r;oups .and were knowp . as . 9r-
ganisasinon-pemerintah { ORNOP ).or non-governµiental 
organisations. But gradually ornops grew in number, 
variety and aims, pro1iferatin15 .l~~e ve~e~tiql} in a 
tropic!"ll forest. /fhe ch1;1.nge in name to L~M .i~ a 
setbe,ck. tJSing S.anskrit words like swar,f,aya Js a 
deliberate form of depoliticisation, like the change 
from buruh (worker) to karyaw~n (functiona~y). ~y 
renaming NGOs a.s LSMs, their identity as organisa-
tions outside government control has been blurred. 
Present-day LSMs cannot be put into opE! bask.et. In 
the early days, their motivation was; prim~rily idealis-
tic, raising people's consciousr!ess, equipping>them 
with knowledge to face corrupt ()fficials .or improving 
their livelihood by means of small-scale, self-help 
projects at the village level. No~, idealism has given 
way to pragmatism. There are ma.ny new LSMi;, often 
indirectly linked with Golkar, th.e government party. 
As in much of the industrialise.cl world, aome d~ve­
lopmynt aid is . chahhelled 'through NGOs. Church 
organisations .~av¢ . a long tradition of channelling 
money to counterparts in third world cottntrie$, At 
prese.nt it is impossible to characterise Indonesian 
L~f.:fs; some .. i;;till function like the ol.d NGOs, v:oicfng 
crjti<.::isF! .. of .• gpvernment. J>rojecta and .. PpUcies. .B\Jt 
others are merely community deveJoper;8• .. a~unning 
social. priticJsrn apd functioning more. or leas as . an 
extell~iop pf govermnent. 
A. new !i!Xpression, Bingo, to.r 'Bi~ .NGO' has emen~)ld• 
Bipgoi; are .bai:;ecj ip Jakar~ and . req~ive most of their 
fundtii from .exte.rnal sources. A,s ·the .. proje<:ts are often 
in ru.ra.l .areas, they suJ?,...contract projects to sm11ll 
NG()s.Jn ,th<:i 1980s, "smalljs beauti.ful" has given way 
to "the necessity of grqwth"d11.1rturing a .. new cai>te 
of BINGO manageri:;, skilled at dealiQg with western 
fu.ri.d~ng agencies . . Submitting projects pas become a 
profession . in itseJ,! •. m:m jobs f:).re like any other job; 
the network of .funding agenqies, develo.pment work-
ers and NGOs have created a world of their own. They 
know each other and meet regularly at in~rnatlonal 
conferences and seminars. 
INGI, a. r:evolntJon.ar)' organisatJon? 
· One network to emerge in the. eigpt:ies is the Inter-
nationtil NGO Forum on 1ndonesit1, known. as . ING!. 
Establishedjn 1985,It inclu.des ma.-i;sr L~Ms and a wide 
range of NGOa from .. different countries. Its ai~s are: 
a. To endeavour to ensure that the Inter Governmen-
tal Group on Indonesia. (IGGI) takes fl,lll account of, 
and positive action. on, important issues affecting poor 
apd ciisaqvantaged g:roups in Indonesia; . . . . .. 
b. To strengthen and broaden: peoples'.· participation 
in development, especially in Indonesia. 
From ·.• the ·. s14rt it was >cle~r that . sensttive human 
rights issues like abuses in East Timar or the treat-
ment of ex-political prisoners would be avoided. Some 
I~donesian BINGOs insisted on this, . as 17 would 
otherwise mean "delivering us into the hands of the 
military". Since its birth, INGI has devoted attention 
to the way development is being impJementeq;: it tias 
met the IGGI chairperson . and communicated "'tith the 
European Community Commission. It has avoided 
radical language, and :aims t(). give positive .input to 
IGGI governments. Surely no~hi.Qg ·could b.e farther 
removed from revolutionary ideals. 
Hence, it came as quite a shock, for Suharto tp. start 
scapegoating +ING!t and accusing it ot <;l~m1;1.ging 
Indonesia's :g<>Qd bnage abroad. What angere5i him in 
particular was a letter sent by, :the INGI meeting in 
Brussels this year to the World Bank regarding the 
Kedung Ombo dam. The letter .called on : th~ Bank's 
president, Barber Conable to ·• seek a comprehensive 
solution for the victims of. the:: dam .. It should,be noted 
that long before this, numei-ous organisations aUpver 
the world, largely at TAPOL's instigation, had already 
written.Jetters of protests on the same issue. .. 
The leaked minutes .of the 5 July cabinet session., 
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that is the rf rteslion 
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noted that before the IGGI meeting, a meetiJlg of NGOs 
took place (the ING! Brussels meeting) jncluding 
LSMs, which was "very damaging for Indonesia". The 
Department of Home Affairs was instructed to ap-
proach the LSMs and "make them understand that 
what they did was reprehensible for the development 
of the nation". The hunting season for .LSMs was on. 
"Riaht or wrona _,. COWlt:t7" 
Armed Forces Commander General . Try Sutrisno was 
one of the first to join the hunt. Indonesians attend-
ing seminars overseas, he said, should not paint a 
dark picture of their own country and take the stand: 
"Right or wrong my country". Ludicrous though this 
may sound elsewhere, in nationalistic Indonesi~ t .his 
outdated expression is now official policy. 
In hot pursuit came Interior Minister, General 
Rudini, threatening to ban LSMs or take them to court 
if they went on tarnishing the name of the country. 
STUDENT PROTESTS _ ____ I 
··~w· 
The retired general alleged that the Indonesians who 
attended the INGI conference were influenced by 
others (read: non-Indonesians) whose understanding 
of human rights differs from Indq~esia's. "The:,under-
standing of human rigllts is + ~e.termined by the 
national philosophy of a state," he s&d~; (Jakarta Post, 
14 August 1989). Rudini should reti:llse that only 
totalitarian states go in for state philosophies. 
Representatives from 23 LSMs 'Were summoned to 
meet him, but even beforehand, some were .showing 
signs of angst, a.nd publicly apolo~ised. '' At . the 
meeting, Rudini behaved like .. a father-figure; insisting 
that one should not "wash o~e's dirty linen in publ-
ic", He proposed t.he creation. ()f a permanent tot,~m 
!or communication between the· government and lhe 
LSMs. This see~ingly . innocuous;' 'ril"oposal can m@[n 
that non~governmeritaf e>rganisation's'·''~ill soon lose ":: 
wbatever independence they stiD enjoy~* 
Students fight militarisation of campus 
The "5 August event'' in Bandung is escalating b.v the day. It started with a. student 
demonstration against the militarisation (1politicisation ', as the students callitJ oJ' the _campus 
grounds. The mili'tary, working closel,v with the Rector of the ITB (Bandung Institute of 
Technology J .• have retaliated harshly. 
The H Pancaalla couree and General Rudlni 
On 5 August the compulsory 'Pimcasila. course (P4) 
was to start for the new batch of students. The day 
before, students organised in , Forum Komunike.si 
Himpunan Jurusan, (FKHJ), Communication Forum of 
Faculties, decided in a mass meeting to reject the 
visit of Interior Minister General Rudini. They . .were 
angry that the ITB authorities had not told them that 
he would officially inaugurate the .P4 course. 
General Rudini has lately become one of the regime's 
most notorious and controversial .figures. As Interior 
Minister, heading the most militarised ministry, Rudini 
holds a key Position · in the cabinet. '. Formerly a low 
profile, professional soldier, he ended· his army career 
as army chief-of-staff in 1985. It was a bit of a 
surprise for many that two years later, Rudini was 
taken out of obscurity by Suharto and appointed to 
this influential post. Rudini soon sta1·ted to :remould 
his rather drab image and became known as a g.reat 
communicator. For a while, it seemed that Rudini was 
backing student protesters and rebellious peasants in 
Kedung Ombo and Cimacan, but very soon it turned 
out that Rudini was just using the 'letting off steam' 
method, so as then to take a firm stand against their 
just demands. The students realise now that Rudini is 
functioning as a Suharto front-man. In this light, his 
visit to the ITB campus was seen as an affront to the 
neutrality of the campus. 
The 5 Auaust deaonatration 
Although the student action was prepared at very 
short notice, the effect was devS:Statmg. Posters, 
banners and second-hand tires had been prepared, 
and just as Rudini was about to ascend the podium, 
17 student representatives unfurled posters and 
demonstratively walked out while a spokesperson read 
a statement rejecting ''outside forces that are trying 
to use this occasion for unhealthy political interests, 
as an individual or a group". The statement rejected 
Rudini's presence on campus and urged the ITB 
authorities to be more cautious towards manoeuvres 
by 'certain political interests. 
Outside, the 17 were cheered and hailed by hund-
reds of student demonstrators. Posters and banners 
were·'unfurled and at strategic spots bonfires were 
started, using old rubber tires. 
Arrests ~d. eXpulslona 
In face of such a protest, 'ITB Rector Wira.nto 
Arismunnndar was furious. Two days later, he issued 
This is ,~he 110st popular T-f!h,irt 
in B~dung these days. 'D,O.' 
now aeans not 'drop-out' but 
'dropped-out' or ex~lled. "No 
to expulsions." 
a circular complaining that he had been disgraced 
( dipermalulcan) by the students ·and ·would impose 
severe sanctions, · preventing the culprits from 
attending C:lasses. But his fury may not have been 
spontaneous, Wiranto is a . cousin of Mrs Tien Suharto 
and his brother, Major-Ge.neral Wislnoyo Arismunandar 
is · commander of the key Central Java division, 
Dfponegoro.' It is not unlik~ly that his response was 
prompted by a call from the pre·sidential palace. 
On the same day, two activists were abducted from 
their homes b,y 10 unidentified persons. The next day 
it was revealed that the plainclothes abductors were 
!Jskorstahasd& of.ficers• This new security agency, . 
which replaced the infamous Kopkamtib last vear was& CJ~,arly defined then RS having flO operation~ C8~8cf-"' 
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ties. With the abduction of At'nold Purba and Moh. 
Jumhur Hidayat, the ctitference between the two 
security bodies has been made· to look cosmetic. · 
Even more upsetting, the two students were illegally 
detained .at the Bakorstana.sda office . . According to 
KUHAP, the procedural code, susp.ects can only be 
detained for .interrogation by the ,police. A student 
delegation tried to meet the two detainees .but was 
rebuffed by heavily-armed security troops. In the 
next few days, more students were taken into custody 
by Bakorstanasda including Bambang SLN. Abdul 
Su bur, Wijaya Santosa and Amarsyah. At the moment 
of writing 11 students are still in custody. The LBH, 
the Legal Aid Institute which has been asked to 
represent the students, has been refused access. 
Meanwhile, Rector Wiranto started implementing his 
threats by expelling nine students. More than 20 
students have nqw been expelled while 11 others have 
been given EJevere warnings. The JRectotc has rather 
unconventional ways of disciplining his students. As 
in soccer, students are given yellow and red cards. 
One yellow C(lr~ denotes a severe warning and two 
Yellows are equivalent to a red card or expulsion, for 
~}ilch the term is di-DO (drop-out). · 
Solidarity growing 
Student activists are now beginning to realise that 
solidarity .. actions in favour of ousted peasants in 
~ed,\.mg Ombo. or Cimacan, whiCh do not directly 
<;,onfront the military, ID{iY not be dealt with violently. 
'But as soon a military man is targeted, ABRI closes 
ranks and behav~s w.ith its customary zeal. 
Near,ly a month p,assed before the first solidarity 
action. was launch,ed. Then Theodorus Jacobus Koeker-
its, known to his friends as Ondqs, a geology student 
in his final, year, starteq a . hunger strilce on 4 Sep-
STUDENT PROTESTS , 
tember, follqwed by Meiyani and Denni. Others who 
qufokl ,v followed were Amarsyah (in detention in 
Bakorstansda), Moy-Moy, Jhoni, Erick, Wawan, tiaris, 
Farvita, Lendo, Supriatito, Rachman and Dwito, who 
went on strike for one or several days. Ondos, the 
first Indonesian to stage a hunger strike !or a socfal-
poiftical issue, continued to refuse food for seventeen 
days. On 21 September, in a condition of extreme 
weakness. he was taken to hospital, leaving Meiyani 
and Denni to continue with their hunger strikes. 
On the sixth day of Ondos•, strike, a huge rally was 
held on the ITB basket-ball pitch ; the traditional 
place for student rallies. Ondos was carried to the 
rally by two students, to address the 1,500 students. 
"If we let people trample on others' rights, it's the 
same as being trampled upon ourselves", he told the 
crowd, gathered to mourn 'the death of democracy at 
ITB'. For the FKHJ, Saritomo read out a statement 
"breaking off relations with ITB. suspending learning 
activities and launching a boycott of classes". So far; 
16 of the 24 faculty associations, accounting for about 
3,000 ,of the 7 ,000 students at ITB, have joined the 
boycott. Not all ITB students are members o! these 
ass.ociations but it is estimated tbat about half now 
support the boycott. [Editor, 23 September] 
Students in UJung Pandang, South Sulawesi hi!-Ve 
also launched actions in solidarity with the ITB 
students. Eleven students started a hunger strike on 
campus. Student senates from teaehers' training 
colleges (IKIP} in eleven university , cities met and 
issued a statement of solidarity with ITB students and 
denounced the brutalities of the army and Bakorsta-
na.s. 
M~dieval sentences for Jogja students 
The trials of the two Bambangs (see Tapol Bulletin n,o 93 & 94) ended in September with ha:rsh 
sentences of 7 Clnd 8 years. Bambltilg Subono, whose only· 'crime' was to sell banned books, 
responded to his 7-.vear sentence on 7 September by shouting at the judges: '10nly for selling 
books of literature, I'm getting 7 ,vears!" A da,v later, Bambang -Isti Nugroho, whose crime was 
to lead a s'tud.v group, was given an 8-year sentence. Both will appeal. 
J'ogja studellta protest 
Since th.e start of the trials, student activists in 
Jogja have used the courtroom as a rallying point. At 
all the hearjngs, the c.ourt-rooms were packed with 
students. Reports, leaflets and articles about the 
trials were produced and circulated to other univer-
sities. Showcase (;rials for the government, the 
Bambang trials have become a symbol ,of injustice for 
many students. A group, Kelompok Solidarita:s Karban 
Penguasa, Group of Solidarity with Re.gime Victims was 
set up to give the defendants all possible support; it 
was composed of students from leading university 
cities in ,Java: Jakarta, Surabaya, Sala:tiga, Solo, 
Bogor, Jogja and Semarang. · . · 
.Subono's verdict caused uproar,,. anger and dismay 
in the public .gallery. After the verdict was ann-
ounced,, 150 students conducted 8. march from S\lnan 
Kalijaga IAIN, a Muslim tertiary college, to the Jog-
jak~rta District Court going through all the major 
streets in the city. 
Another bloody iJicf,dent 
The next day, Friday, a crowd three times as big 
assembled outside the court building to await Isti 
Nugroho's verdict. Security forces were fu]]y prep-
ared and a combined force of the police, mobile 
brigade and army, equipped with semi-automatic 
Students protesting against the bloody attack by anMd 
troops on students dea:>nstrattng against the sentenc-
ing of the two Bambangs. !hei;r banner reads: "Comme-
mmora,ting Bloody Jo!lja." [Editor, 2;i Septeaber 1989) 
rifles, stood _guard round the building. At noon the 
trial adjourned, and the studentiJ- said F;riday ~ray­
ers. Halim, a stu~ent activist from IAIN Kalijaga, 
lea4ing . the , prayers, said judges ,. should use their 
common sense and mete oµt justice, whll~ the prosec-
uti<)n .and military intelUgence should not use dirty 
methods. Halim was later arrested. ln the afternoon, Ii 
Isti Nugrciho's 8-year verdict was announced, again., 
giving vent to emotion and anger. 
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Some students shouted: "Let's go to the DPRD (local 
assembly)". As they started marching, secl,.lrity forces 
trapped them from all directions. The students >!Were 
encircled and started singing revolutionary songs. 
The security forces moved in, used tear gas and 
started striking out at the peaceful protestors with 
rifles an(! bayonets, men and women alike. At least 
fifteen students were arrested, including three 
women. Bystanders were also beaten and kicked. Many 
people were injured, five of them seriously. 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Later that evening a Student Defence Team was set 
up to trace the whereabouts of students who had 
been injured and check up. on those who had been 
arrested. At around midnight, the police announced 
that 29 students were being held. Three injured stu-
dents were located in Panti Rapih hospital. 
After being interrogated, it seems that all the 
students were released.ii-
IPU pressure wins release forjailed MP 
Siti Abdulrahman Sundari, Indonesia's longest-serving 
woman political prisoner, was released from prison on 
17 August. Her release was given widespread publicity 
in the press, suggesting that it came as the result of 
pressure from a.broad. At the time of her release, she 
was 68 years old. 
Siti Sundari had been a political activist since 
before the war and in 1945, entered a youth organisa-
tion in Semarang, later becoming chair of the Sema-
rang Working Women's Association. She was a found-
ing member of the leftwing women's organisation, 
Gerwis, which later became Gerwani ( Gerakan Wanita 
Indon~sia or Indonesian Women's Movement), one of 
the many organisations that was banned, along with 
the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 1 when the 
military took power in 1965. From 1951, she was a 
member of Gerwani's Executive Council. 
In the Hl55 general ielections, she stood as a can-
didate for the Communist Party and was elected to 
Parliament. She became a member of the party's 
Central Committee in 1964 and was in its Women's 
Affairs Department. 
Siti Sundari was arrested in 1968 in Lampung, South 
Sumatra where she was active underground after 
fleeing from Jakarta in October 1965 at the time of the 
mass arrests. She was not tried until OCtober 1976 
when she received a life sentence; the sentence was 
later commuted to twenty year.s. 
MPs 'ttend her nlease cereraon7 
Sundari's release was given unusually high-profile 
attention. Four members of Parliament were at the 
prison to attend the release ceremony, among them 
Soesatyo Mardi and Theo Sambuaga, the chair and 
deputy chair of BKSAP, the inter-parliamentary group 
which handles relations between the Indonesian 
Parliament and the Inter-Parliamentary Union fIP(J) 
and parliaments worldwide. 
Although high officials were on hand and must have 
known well in advance of Sundari's release, members 
ot her family who came to greet her and take her 
home had been taken completely by surprise. They 
told the press that they heard . nothing about her 
release until the night before. [ Suara Kar,va, 22 
August 19891 
The Public Relations chief of the armed forces, Brig-
General Nurhadi issued a statement insisting that 
Sundari had been released because '"she has properly 
fulf_illed the conditions for release'\ It was hotly 
denied that her release had anything to do with 
pressure from the IPU although Sambuaga admitted 
that the IPU has been pressing for her release for 
the past ten years. 
Despite all these protestations, it is clear that 
international pressure saved Sundari from ,another six 
or seven years in prison, In November, 1984, · when 
members of Parliament visited Tanggerang Prison 
where she was held, to investigate congition~ there, 
she used the occasion to tell journalists that her 2.0-
year sentence did not permit any deduction for the 
eight years she spent in detention prio1· to her t~ial 
in 1976. This mean that she . was pot du~ for release 
until 1996, by which time she would be 75 years old. 
[Sinar Harapan, 2.3 Novepiber 1984] 
Now however, to confuse matters .and coriceal the 
role of internatfonal pressure, it is being stated not 
that her life sentence was commuted to 20 years but 
that it was changed to "temporary punishment" 
( hukuman sement.ai·a ' )1 a term that appears to have 
been specially invented for the occasion, so as not to 
let it be known thf!,t internatiqna,l .. pressure had any 
bearing .on< her case. · 
Her release came just a couple of weeks before this 
vear's !PU conference in London from 3 till 9 Septem-
ber. · As ·. Tempo comments: "Sundari's release will · lift 
the pressure on the Indonesian delegation, led by 
Kharis Suhud, speaker of Parliament, which is leaving 
for London this month to attend the IPU meeting in 
London." According to MarzukiDarusman, a Golkar MP 
who also witnessed Sundari's release at Tanggerang, 
"this is very good for Indonesia's image abroad". 
r Tempo, 2 September 19891 
.__..:~--------~---....; ________________________________ _ 
Death Sentence prisoner dies in priaon 
Anastasius Buang, a political prisoner arrested on 5 
October 1965, who was sentenced to death in Novem-
ber 1969 and has thus spent the past twenty years 
with a death sentence hanging over him, died in 
Cipinang Prison in late August. He was 49 years old. 
He is unde:rstood to have 'died after contracting 
angina and passed away while a fellow prisoner was 
administering a traditional form of medicine. Members 
of >his family are believed to have B.sked for an 
autopsy, to determine the cause of death. 
Huang was a low-ranking soldier attached to the 
Cakrabirawa palace guard · in 1965, and was a member 
of one of the units which, acted under orders, kid-
napped seven army generals, whose ••· subsequent 
murders led to the military seizure of power and the 
crackdown and massacre of hundreds of thousands of 
communist suspects.'* 
12 TAPOL' Bulletin No• 96, October 1989 
HUMAN RIGHTS . 
Indonesia under fire at the UN in Geneva 
For the Lif~pung massacre 
Speaking at the .trN Sub-Commisliibn on Preven.tio.n of 
.Piscrimination (:l.nd Protection of Minorities on behalf 
of the Re~kmal Council .. on Human Rights in Asia, and 
deputising for H._r.i Princ~n who .":'as umible to attend 
(see page 4) Jusf{q Ha.dja.r gave' details of the mas-
sacre of villagers in Talang Sari, Lampi.mg. The 
authorities admitted that 27 persons were shot dead 
shot (others have put the death toll far highel'} 
though no-one was able to check the facts as the area 
was closed to outsiders after the massacre. He also 
spoke about the widespread destruction and burning 
down of houses and crops in Pulau Panggung last 
Nqveml;i.~~Af,9 aga.in from,}-Iarch. ~ill ;.,.May th~ :rear 
[see TAPOL' Bulletin'; No 94) August 11.9891. . J ... 
Concluding his statement, Hadjar called on the Sub-
Commission: 
1. to ask the Indonesian authorities to permit 
fl'eedoni of movement and allow Mr Princen to travel 
abroad as he wishes, and come to Geneva for futtire 
meettrigs of the Commission and sub-commission) 
2. to back the request by the Legal Aid Foundation 
and the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights for 
an indepel}dent commission of inquiry to be? set. up to 
investigate the events in Talang Sari in February and 
the events in Pu1au Pa.nggung. 
Govern~:nt'a response 
The Indonesian ·· observer delegation responded to 
Had,jar"s statement, avoiding ari'y mention of the 
refusal of the government to permit Princen to come 
to Geneva. (Any tneritfori of this, whether tcf admit that 
he had b~en refused a permit or to deny it, would 
only have rttade ~i:itters worse for the government.) 
On the Lampung events, the delegation only repea-
ted the government's ve~sion of the killings and. said: 
"The Goverment of Indonesia has completed its full 
investigation of the so-called Lampung incident. Ten 
of those responsible ate in the J>l'ocess ot being 
brought to trial in an open court and will be dealt 
with fn accordance with du~ process ·of Jaw," So much 
for their response to the call for an · independ~nt 
commission of inquiry! 
For ·discrimination against ex-ta Pols 
Spea.ldn~ at the Sub-Commission <?P behalf of the 
London-based NGO, Liberation, Carmel Budiardjo of 
l'4POJ,. once a~ail'l 9alled ~tte.ntion to the systematic 
discrimination . agai!lst 1,.4 ,million former political 
prisoners and their farnilie.s."They are . denied their 
civil rjghts, the right to a )pb, to freedom of move-
ment and association and to take part in public life. 
They are outcasts with no legal redress... Without 
internatiortalaction, they .will spend the .. rest of .their 
days as victims of a system that violates the · Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights," shP. said. 
Sh~ gave recent examples of this qh~criminatfon: 
* Ex-prisoners must <.:arry identity cards marked 
'ET' to help local authorities keep tz.:.ack of their 
whereabouts and activities. Following an announce-
ment by the Jakarta Municipality that there are 8,597 
people with 'ET'-"coded identity cards iti the capital 
[Merdeka, 1 March 19891, J .C. Princen, direct.or of the 
Institute for the Defence of Human Rights in Jakarta 
wrote to the Municipality saying: "This a.mounts to a 
verdict of guilty without any process in a court of 
law, in violation of Articles 1 .to 7 of the Univei-sal 
Declaration ot Human Rights." 
* ' Villagers in Central Java recently complained to the 
Jogjakarta b.egal .Aid Institute that, because their own 
card~ · are mark.e.d 'ET', their children and even their 
grandchildren ")l.ave been refused jobs in govermrient 
departments and face a bleak future". [Kede.ulatan 
RIJ.}cya.t, .16. February 1989) 
* Students at a teacher training college in Semarang. 
were requireci to .take a 'clearance test' set by . the 
security agency to . vouchs~e their 'clean environ-
ment' before completing their course, "It is better 'to 
vet them now.'' .said the Rector, "and avoid problems 
later on when. they apply fo:r;job,s.'! .{Tempo,. 8 April 
1989} . 
* Applicants . for jobs in the North Sumatra adminis-
tration were questioned ab<,1ut the political aftiliation.s 
of their . parents and grandparent~ before being 
appointed• [ Waspada, 1 February 1989] 
* The West Sumatra Education Department .requires 
all new employees to produce a 'Clean Environment 
Certificate' .(Surat Ketere.ngan Bersih Lingkunge.n) 
~e!ore their appointment can be approved. f See: 
Anno~.ncea}en,t of the West Smµatra. Education Depart-
ment. No. 11..635/106.l.2/C-1988"1 
* Pozens of employees ~t the Surabaya Waterworks 
were dismisf'!ed, wit!) m9re dismissals ,t<:> come, because 
they were found to b.e 'politically unclean' [Jawa Po$, 
1 Fel;>ruary 1989.]. 
* Three film stars have been banned from making 
any more a.pp~arances on television, . on suspicion of 
being 'politiC!J.llY unclean'. [Jawa pos, 1 January 1989] 
The e;ii:ecutive director for seventeen years of the' 
Gajah Mada University Press was forced to resign f9r 
the same reason, . 
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* Members of Commission II of Parliament acknow-
ledge that the 'c,lean environment' criterion has an 
deleterious effect on the promotion prospects of 
government employees. f JaJira Pos, 6 July 1989] 
She called on the Sub-Commission to appoint a 
special rapporteur to investigate this discrimination. 
It should also call on the Indonesian Government, 
to rehabilitate everyone suspected of pre-1965 
involvement in organisations banned in 1965, 
to abandon all schemes to classify citizens 
according to their (alleged) political beliefs, and 
to revoke all regulations which infringe their 
civil rights. 
Goverruaent1a response 
The Indonesian observer delegation claimed in reply 
that "practically all of those who were suspected and 
detained following the abortive (sic) coup have been 
set tree and reintegrated into society." Unable to 
refute the cases mentioned in testimony to the Sub-
Commission, the observer delegation then said: "There 
may howeyer be some over-zealomi officials wh.o have 
int~rpreted (the screening required for members of 
the armed forces) to cover the 'clean person' and 
'Clean environment' concepts , but in no way does this 
constitute official government policy."* 
How the 'sins' of a father destroyed a career 
(The following letter was published in Kompas .on 12 
February 1989, in the PersonalAdvice column of Leila 
Ch. Budiman.] 
Dear Leila, 
Because of the bersih Jingkungsn (clean environment) 
issue, I have experienced a tragic fate. I should. have 
been able to overcome this by myself, but the longer 
the problem drags on, the more complex things 
become. I feelmore and more isolated, often confused. 
l feel as if people are distancing themselves from me. 
I know many sympathise and feel sorry for me. But all 
they can do is shrug their shoulders. 
My father, a WNI (an ethnic Chinese Indonesian 
citizen), was well off and helped any organisation that 
came to him for support. My mother says the PKl 
managed to persuade my father to join the party 
though he had only been to primary school and didn't 
fully understand their aims. 
In 1965 he was arrested. His business was taken 
over and our family became destitute. As he was 
unable to adjust to prison life, he died that year; 
leaving several young children behind. Fortunately, 
my mother had never Joined anything so she was able 
to look after us and became a petty trader. 
Thanks to her efforts, we all went to school-. After 
leaving school, the older children went to work so as 
to pay for the younger children's schooling. I was the 
most fortunate; I completed my education and tOok a 
degree. 
As a student I was quite innovative, and the univ-
ersity took advantage of my skills. My background 
made me avoid joining anything, especially organisa-
tions with political tendencies, on or off-campus. · I 
only joined the professional organisation associated 
with my own discipline. I was terrified of supporting 
anything, fo deed or in thought, except for making 
donations to religious foundations. I shunned politics. 
My mother, brothers and sisters always urged me to 
work hard in my own field. 
I was very successful in my profession and took 
charge of several departments. But, 'because of bersih 
Jingkungsn, everything has collapsed. Everything I 
was proud of has faded, it's all just a memory. 
I was asked to resign from my chief post, half 
retaining the other posts. But I submitted my resig-
nation. I calmly faced everything without blaming 
anybody, thinking that maybe I would some day g~t 
my reward, b1,1t whe11 it came, it was topilly unex-
pected. My girl-friend started distancing herself from 
me. I remaJned resolute, even proud to be on my own, 
which spared me all the hypocris.y, including the 
hypocrisy of my girl-friend. I was still in good .spirits 
but my room for manoeuvre was extremely limited. 
. I am willing to be tested in Pimcasila ideology and 
the · 1945 Constitution. I have a,ttended a 1~0-hour 
indoctrination course on Pancasila ideology (P4). 
Everyone knows that although my father wasinvolv~d 
in the PKI, I was only 9 years old when , he <iie.d. I 
was never under communist inflt,1ence bf'!cause I 
understood nothlng. I didn't even like politics. I 
never raised any questions. I accepted thir,igs as they 
were. 
Leila, the worst thing .is that I (eel as if I have been 
cheated. I feel all alone. I feel as if ever.yone is 
rejecting me . . I was ordered to leave town and fi~d 
work elsewhere, as if ·people were afraid of .. my 
presence. I felt I was being blamed for something 
though I blamed no-one for anything. I became con-
fused, af;-aid · to work, afraid to . get marrieq, even 
though I was gettingon in years. i canpot forget how 
my girl-friend left me. Being a civil servant, E;he was 
afraid that my difficulties would rub off on her. ,/ 
I work for a small firm connected with my family but 
I am sick at heart, because I am not working in my 
own '. profession; ' It's f(s if I've .. been told to' burn all 
the books lever hado1· ,read, a's if I've been told not 
to be creative, not .to think, only to work hard. 
I am confused. I don't blame anyone. Is this right? 
What should I do? What is it all about?*,,· 
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Su~version ,trials, an unending saga 
In mid August, Attorne.v General Sukarton Marmosudjono announced tha.t 46 trials will soon 
start. all under the Anti-Subversion Law of 1963. As all those previously tried under this 
draconian law know [~om their own experience, sentences are invariably severe a.nd defen-
dants fa.ce extreme p~essure a.nd intimidation, and have no chance of getting a. fair trial. 
MualilQ trials 
The ma,Jority of the 46 accuse(!. will be Muslim .defen-
dants, facing triili in .Places . like aanda~ Lampung, 
Jal}.~rta, Bima and Bandung. 
·1~ _the Lampung case, ac;f.9rding to public prosecu-
tors office, 14 people wHl be tried. The Latnpung 
niasfiacre, or the Cihideu!l}{Affair as the government 
now .calls it, was perpetra,ted last February· it was 
primarily a land conflict bet)ofeen the military' ~uthori­
tjes and the 109al people. The local army comll)!lnder, 
Captain sut.iman who was known locally as a man of 
b.rutal habits and frequently inf.licted physical 
punishment on villageri:;, was killed durins one of .the 
clashes •. The military ·reta!Jated, sendlng in troops 
from Jakarta. and e.t. least 100 v.illa.gers were mas-
sacred on the spot;. others . managed to escape. The 
milit;ary have picked on a Musli.m group based in the 
area as the culprits, identifying them as subversives. 
·Warsidi, a popular l<X:al preacher was theJeader of 
the c 'plpt' otherwise known as Jamaah •Mujahidin 
F'isabililtih (for 11 full account, see TAPOL Bulletin No. 
92) and was apparently killed during ·the raid. Alleged 
followers of his who wlll be tried include Zamzuri bin 
Moch. Roji, 46, accu$ed ot killing Sergeant-Major 
Soedargo; Marsudi bin Martoprawiro, 50, older brother 
of Warsidi;Jayus bin Karmo, 38, accused of giving the 
rebels lodgings; and Ji~adilla:h e.Iias Wiryo Sugito, 30, 
ac9used of ~eading the attack on the Military District 
Office on 9 February, two days after the bloodbath. 
Two other suspects ·are · M. :Musbonii' bin Ahmad 
Matzuki, 24, and Abatti Abdullah Shn.fomartono. 321 
both from a small Muslim pesantren. school in Centre.I 
Java, the Ngruki Pesantten. In the la$t few years, 
this school }las, frequently · been branded as. the base 
for an alleged, subversive Muslim movemen,t krio'Wn by 
the name Usroh. Other defendants are Sri Haryadi 
Sofyan, Harianto bin Yusuf1 Sugeng Yulianto bin Harto 
Irjoyo and Nurdiansyah bin Yasak. 
In the capital, Jakarta. 7 people will be tried, · al-
legedly involved in a group called Komando Mujtihidin 
Fisabililah, led by Nur Hidayat alias Abdullah, an 
immigration <officer (:l,nd well known as one of Indone-
sia's finest karate sportsmen. The seven were ar-
1·ested in late February and accused of planning 
economic instability by attacking important trade 
Indonesia: Mus.lims on trial 
Publislledby TAPOL, the tndonesi~ HumanRlght~ Campaign 
Since early 1985, more than TSO Musllmshave b¥en tried, canlflcted and senh1nced lo 
heavy let ins ol lmprlsonrnent In Indonesia lot giving public sermon$ critical olthe 
government, conducting religious courses not approved.~ 1he authorlti8$, or 
producing hlaRets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held 
responaibl• tor bombing l~klents fhal wa111 never properly ln11&s!iga1ed. 
The trials followed lhe army's crackdown on a demonstration ol Muslims In 
Septombet 198~. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killec:t !"hen lroops opened llfe 
on Iha unarmed crowd. The t.nals took place a1 a lime ol deepdi$quiet In Indonesia 
about lhe. military govemment's lmposilion of total i"8-0logical conformity, pravontlng 
organisations !tom proclalm1ng Islamic or 0th.er r~ll(lioUs prlnclpl&s. 
Indonesia: MtJ$/lm# on trial arialyses lh8 l11al$, plQclog Ulem in the conlextol lhe 
continuing conflict between ln.doll!"~la'.s t.1u$llms and Ille mihtary regime. 
128 pp .. £4.00 plus p &p. 
ISBN 0 9506751 4 8 
centres like Glodok and pasar Pagi. Besides Nur 
Hidayat, thre.e others names were made public: Fauzi, 
22, Abdul Fatta.h Kasim, 48, and Mau•ana Abdul Latief, 
32. 
The third group to go on trial are defendants from 
the isle of Sumbawa, allegedly involved in a revolt 
that took place in the same period. The events in 
Bima:, the region where the clash took place, are still 
shrouded in mystery. Quite important local Muslim 
leaders will be put on trial: Ha.Ji Abdul Gani Masjkur, 
63, chair of the Muhammadyah branch and lecturer in 
Arabic at the Muhammad;vah University, and M· Nur 
Husein, 60; Golkar representative in the local . DPRD 
assembly. Two others are Ahmad ; Hµsein and .• Zainal 
Arifin. · · 
Five suspects will be tried in .Bandung: Eme~g 
Abdurraqhman, $ofiandi, Burhanuddin,_ lrin Sobirin 
and. Syaiful Mali}{ accused of involvement in NII 
(Negara Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim State). 
The Wa:taidi trials 
On 2.<F Septehiber subversion< trials .•st;.art~d in the 
Bandar Lampung District Court against sµt defen-
dants. The same char.ges wer~. put against them,. being 
involved in attacks and k11Iings of a police officer 
a village . head . ~nd a NCO soldier. Five . of the si.x 
refused to be defended by a lawyer, only Sugeng 
Yuliant()c deciqe.d to accept a . team of lawyers. The five 
qthers: Fadillah, Sri Haryadi, Ha:r,-janto, Zamzuri and 
~htnjaini alias Munjen .commented that Allah ap.d his 
Prophet would be sufficient to defend their rights.* 
Asia ; FOCUS OF nIE Ftm!RE, SHACKLED BY POVERTY 
- Social A.oalysi• 
- !UHn Righti 
- Labor News 
- People's Power 
' A p11'11utit1 tf Ue CUI.er ftr Ue Pncrw tf Petplu, ti Priacm llftml INd, luf lt•C· 
li-•1Ul7. 1in1il nlu: uil • 113flG; llnrbn - usus. ..... , fee I • ..,1. q17. 
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West Papuan nationalist gets 
20 years 
Dr Thomas Wainggai, the West Papuan nationalist who 
was arrested on l4 December 1989 during a mass act 
of defiance in Jayapura's St>Q.rt.s s~dium, has been 
sentenced to 20 years by the Jayapura District Court. 
Many of the . .other thirty-six who were detained with 
him, including hts JaJ>anese-born wifE)• Teruko, have 
also been tried and are awaiting sentence. Dr Waing-
gai i s to appeal against this outrageous sentence. 
From documerits recently received, it is now clear 
that the flag-raising ceremony on 14 December was 
intended tQ be the proclamation of independence of a 
WestMelanesian state. More than .seventy Wgst Papu-
ans are known lo have taken: >part in the event, 
including a number of Protestant ministers. According 
to the W~st Papuan People's Front in a statemen t at 
the UN (see below), the organisers of the event had 
sent invitations to the Governor, the military com-
mander and police chief and other authorities to 
attend. "The Indonesian authorities did not react (to) 
the invitations and instead arrested many of the 
participants." 
Until now, it has been very difficult to learn anyth-
ing about the trials. Because of widespread public 
interest in the hearings which attracted large crowds 
eager to follow the proceedings outside the courtroom, 
the location of the trial was moved to a military base 
on the outskirts of Jayapura. Some 2,000 people tried 
to attend the earlier hearings; the fifty who were 
allowed into the courtroom were accompanied, by ... 70 
security personnel. 
While the trial was in progress, there were no 
reports of the proceedjngs in the Indonesian press, 
only an announcement by the Attorney-General that 
'TW' was on trial for subversion. According to Jakarta 
West Papua: The 
Obliteration of. a 
People 
The. first two editions of this book 
appeared in 1983 and 1984. This 
third edition, published in response 
to continuing demand, has been 
substantially revised and updated, 
with new data on militacy operatiO!lS, 
an appendix on the murder of the 
well-known West Papuan anthropol-
ogist, Arnold Ap, and recent informa-
tion about the exploitation of West 
Papua's natural resources. 
Published by Tapol, the 
Indonesia Human Rights 
Campaign. 160pp. 
Price: £3.50 
plus postage 
Tapol, 111 Northwood Road, 
Thornton Heath, Surrey CH4 
8HW, UK 
Dr Thofaas Wainggai on trial in Jayapura. [1'e111,PO, 16 
Septeaber 1989] 
Post, (11 September], at . the end of the . trial, the 
judges decided .to destroy evidence in the ; form of 
documents. containing the tex,t' of the constiti.1tion for 
a Free Melanesii;i.n state and letters asking for the 
support of many UN member countries. 
No defence documents have yet been received 
abroad though it is understood that Dr W;,tinggai. and 
his wife, defended West Papua's right to independence 
, by recalling among other things that . the preamble to 
the Indonesian Constitution says .that every nation 
has .the right to independence. 
The local authorities were so sensitive about p,ress 
interest in the triat that the ' BBC .correspondent, 
Juliet Rix, who was in Jayapura when .the verdicttwaa 
announced, was asked to leave the .t!'lrritory becat1se 
of a report she filed about the verdict. She .was told 
by officials that the story of Tom W'ainggai ·is "very 
secret" even though the sentencing had been repor-
te.d • by the<official news agency ,.and by at least two 
Jakarta dailies. [BBC report br~dcast by the: ln-
donesfan-language servic~, 13 September 1989] 
Attempts not to make .the verdict public, at least in 
Jayapura, sug.gest that the .• authorities there are 
acutely embarr:assed by . the brol!.d sympathy and 
s .upport among West Pa.puans fqr what happened on 14 
December . . The 37 people who have been detained 
since 14 December include seven ministers of religion, 
of whom four are from the Pentecostal church. 
Another four West Papuans from Serui were ar-
rested in. April this ye~r f<:>J.• alleg~dly . P!anning to 
raise the West Melanesian flag in Jayai>ura. They too 
are t6 .be charged "(ith stlbversion an.<fare awaiting 
trial. · 
Thf.l Aucl,~and-based . Pacific Con.c~rns Resou1·ce 
Centre issued an action alert on .11 August, calli~g !or 
support for the West Papuan nationalists facing heavy 
sentences in Jayapura. 
Ap{>e61 .to the UN 
From documents that pave just become availa.ble, .we 
now know. that one month befoi·e the flag-raising 
ceremony on 14 December, Dr Wainggai, a.s chairman of 
the Melanesian Independence Committee, sent an .. 
appeal to the UN Secretary-General making the follow-If 
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ing demands; 
1. The UN should send a securit:v-keeping force to 
West Melanesia before 14 Decemb~r the dav of the 
proclamation of the jndependence qi West M~lanesia. 
2. The l.JN fihc5uld ask t~e Indonesian aovernment to 
pe.acefully withdraw aH its milita.rv forces from West 
Melanesia before 14 December. · 
3. . . . 'rhe .UN should ask the Indonesia)'} Government to 
repa.tria,te ·all lndonesi£lns residing a:nd ·working in 
West Melanesia before 1~ December. 
The five-'page document, copies of whiCh were sent 
to .15 ,governments around the w.orld, argues that West 
Melanesia is ready ·tor in~ependence; it )las ·en()t1gh 
skilled personnel and enough resourcE:ls . as well as its 
owll Cona~itution, ~atio.nal Flagt Anthem. and develop-
ment plan. The document is laced with biblit81 quota-
tions, anq proclaims that 'West Melanesia's State Motto 
is 'The Lord is my Shepherd'. 
Dr Wainl!Ut«i•a ba,.ckground 
Th~mas Wainggai who was born in Ambal village, 
~eru1, on . (5 De~e,111be,r 1Q~7 t ,)1a$. a distinguished 
~cade.mJc . ba,ckground. He . has been wovking for local 
govermnent ,in Jayapura since 195$ when it was still 
a Dutch colony. His most r ,ecent post . was .on the sta.ff 
of exper~~ .. at the provincial pla,nning board (Bappeda). 
He p~s thr.ee degrees, a law degree f:rom Okay~ plate 
Un,iver~ity, Japa;n (1969), a <legree in Pu'Qlic,Adminis-
tr.~tion ft;om New York State. Univ~rsity , (1981} and a 
Ph.D. in philosophy from Florida State Uniyersity 
(1$85,). 
He w1;ts also nominated as a cal'}<;iid~te for gov:ernor 
of Jrian ,~a;va,. when the }?osit:ion became vacant at the 
WEST PAPUA 
end of 1987 and succeeded in collecting a large 
number of signatures for his candidacy. [Tempo, 16 
Septeml?erl 
West Papua at UN Working Group 
In a statement to the UN Working Group on In-
digenous Populations, held in Geneva in August 1989, 
a representative of the OPM/West Pa:puan People's 
Front said that since · 19 November 1969 when the 
General Assembly accepted the Secretary-General's 
report on the fraudulent 'plebiscite' in West Papua, 
the people >of . West Papua ha.ve , continued to be 
colonised by Indonesia •. ''We have often heard the UN 
condemning European colonialism and South African 
racism, but it never . seems to think of Asian 
colonialism and racism;.;, We as Melanesians are being 
discriminated (against) and colonised by an Asian 
state, Indonesia." 
It drew attention to the economic and cultural 
exploitation and nolitiqal oppression of the Asmat 
people, ,to the sufferings inflicted on the Amungme 
peop.le since tile UN mu,ltinational Freeport copper 
mine was established in 1967 and warned that the 
15,000 Auyu tribal people are li~ely to meet the same 
fate .. when .Astra Scott Celulosa sets up eucalyptus 
plantations.on their lands. ·· 
The People's Front calleo on the.:UN. to resume its 
responsibility fpr .West J?~pua from which it withdrew 
twenty ye~rs ago, ~.ked ~or a speciaL.rapporteur to 
be sent to .-West {'apua to investigate how the people's 
rights ::can }:)e . .implemented, and asked for West ;Papua 
to be placed on the agenda of the UN Decolonisation 
Committee.* 
~01.1nt~r-insurgency flop in'We .. stJ>apua 
A five ·• month fount.er-insurgency opetatfon in West 
Papua code-named .. Opera,~i Ra.jawa.1iwas l<lunched ear-
lier this . year, no~ long after tp.e present military 
comm~nder of the. re.~fon, Major-General Al:Jinowo, to0k 
over command of . the Cendrawasih Military command 
last · F~fo·uar)'· This comman(l covers the provinces of 
Iria,.n Jaya (West Papua) and Maluku (the Moluccas)~ 
On .1 August1989, Abinowot .in an t1~t1sually hi~h­
profile statement abbut the operatior1s', claimed that 
one OPM leader named as Elyas Awom had surrendered 
and ai:i:9Jl1er; nailied ft.$ Joel • Dem9toka:y, had been 
~.f~led~ Thi$ 's\lggests,. th~t the· op~ration has hardly 
been: c·rowned with success. Mqr~over, Abinowo was 
sµrprisingly · frarik ·aboti t ,the c9vt.hrned prevalence of 
wha,t he called "sepax;a,tist ideofogies'' not only in West 
Pa.pua, ,but also in the Moh1~cas.:·· ~'We still need to be 
vj~ilant of the. Jdeology of separ,lj-qsm which is called 
the sol.1th . M9luccan Republic CRMS) and the Free 
Papµa, Movement (OPM), along .'.With the latent com-
mun.i~t danger." [ Suara Merdek.a;,> 2 August 19891 
f A c.Jaim · made earlier that al)other OPM leader, 
Philemon Ye.rjsetow, w~s also killed has since been 
strongly . de:nied by West· Papuan refugees in Papua 
New Guinea. J . . . < 
The Abil'l.owo statement.· ha.s raised eyebrows in 
Jakarta. He "'as· quqted · a~ saying that Opers.si Rajs.-
wf!,/t~t4-s aime(j at ''flushing out 9J?M units in the area 
cfose .'t::o the bor.?;r withPNG". Yet one area mentioned 
by Abinowo is 11ear Na,p.~re .in Pani~i district which is 
nowhere nel.'l.t. / the border} f Far . Eastern Economic 
Review, 17 AugusL 198$/.l ' ;:<;<··:;< ·'·· ·. •:· . . :.:· . - ...... , .. , 
PNG denial 
Abinowo also claimed that Indonesian and !'NG 
troops had lllounted Joint Patrols along the. border to 
destroy OPM .1,lnits. This provoked a denial from Port 
M?resby where a Foreign Affairl:I official said that al-
though there had been , a re_quest from Jakarta for 
joint patrols, it was rejected as .PNG regards the OPM 
a~ an internal Indonesian probh~m. It tefus~d to 
incorporate a clause about joint patrols wh~~ th~ two 
countries concluded a treaty of mutual respect in 
1987.;r [ Pos:t Oo11rie1y 8 August 1989} Talks. las.t July 
between Indonesia and PNG Qn . borqer ... issu~s (l.lso 
failed . toreach a~reemen,t on joinf patrdls. f .FEEJi; '17 
August 19891* · 
For subscriptions information on 
Incbnesia News Sei:vice, Briefing Books 
ang ptll~ publlcatiqns regarQing Indqnesia, please 
write to: 
Indonesia PQbli.catiOOs 
7538 Newbeny Laoo, .Lanham.,;~rook MD 20706 
U.S.A. 
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Resettlement threatens the Dani people 
The authorities in West Papua are using an earth-
quake in the Baliem Valley as grounds for undertak-
ing a mass re~settlement ot Dani tribespeople to low-
lying areas, within easy reach of government control. 
The earthquake struck the district of Kurima on 1 
August causing about 120 deaths with many wounded. 
Twelve days later, plans were announced to re-,settle 
4,000 Dani people along the site of. the planned road 
connecting Jayapura and Warnena while the govern-
ment said also that two geologists had been sent to 
the area, apparently to confirm that future earth-
quakes made such re-settlement unavoidable. r Jakarta 
Post, 14 Augu1;Jt] 
Juliet Rix in The Observer [ 1 October 1989] reports 
that 3,500 Dani will be re-settled in a programme that 
will eventually affect 43,000 tribespeople. But people 
who have been working in the area for many years 
warn that re-settling the mountainous Dani people in 
low~lying areas will render them vulnerable to malar.:... 
ia, causing far more deaths than any earthquake. 
They fear that, like past efforts to 'help' the tribes-
people, this resettlement plan ·· could go ·disastrous 
wrong. Official pledges to provide malaria prophylac-
tics for the first six months or so can be given little 
credence, bearing in mind the inadequacy of medical 
facilities in the West Papuan interior. 
DEATH ON DELIVERY: 
THE fMPACT OF nm ARMS .• ;RADE ON TllE THIRI) \VORI.D 
International news cm·eragc is dominatc<.I by images of war, poverty and 
rcprcssi0n. Almost alwars thei;e Images c<ime froni somewhere in the 
Third World and scrm far rcnion:d from Orftain. llnt arc they really so 
distant from Brit ish (;oncerns? Mnny of the countries rad<ed by conOict are 
customers of British arms comp«nk·~. Behind the .i<cenes; firltaln is thus 
deeply fmrll<.~llcd , :ilongside a ho!<t of otht•r arms producing t·ountrfes In 
both E:1s1 and Wt·st. Wl1 h annu:il sales now running into SC\'cral billions of 
pounds, Britain is amnnitst rhe ,.,~>rld's tor fou r arms trader~ .. 
Death on Ddl~ry examines the impact of the arms trade on the Third 
World. It looks oot only at the iton:rnments and armed forces which buy 
the weapon.~ but also al 1hc people: on the recei\'ing end of arms 
purd1ascs. llsinJt a M"rics oC spn·lfk cx:unplc:s. thi• hook assesses the 
extent to which the arms trade Is responsible for the conflict, ix~rty llnd 
state violence haunting so many people'~ lives. Indonesia, Iran and Iraq arc' 
arnong5t the rrrnnr C3SC~ citt:'d. Abo cm·ercd art:' the connt:'ctlons lletwecn 
debt and milit:if}' purch:i~s. lh!=. link between arn1s1ra.nsft:'rs and ·ni1rd 
World arms production, and the current trends In the global arms trade. 
The concluding chapter reports on the mart)' initiatives which have~cn 
taken against the arms trade, both in F.urope and in the Third World . 
Onku dir.,c1.10 Camp•i1111 Against ~rms Trad.,, ti Goodwin Street, London N4 3{1Q. 
Tclo Ol ·211t 0297. 
l'lc•5C <Cnd mr ___ cop)'(S) of Drath on DcUvery 
ct ."4.25 ( includes poslag" •nd packing}. 
Rix also reports that the government wants the Dani 
to abandon their honai for 'healthy ho1.1ses' (wood and 
corrugated ir on cuboids). Many have already been 
built but they remain empty because the Dan~ i:;Uck to 
their own . traditlonal homes. 
The governor of Irian Jaya, Bas S1.1ebu, <Mkl)ow-
ledges that moving .the D~is ~ill not go unopposed. 
"The inhabitants of Kudrna have previously be~n 
moved but they later returned home," he said. { Suara. 
Pembaruan, 1.4 August 19891 
Frey sentenced in PNG for illegal 
entry 
Theo Frey, the Swiss pilot who created a storm when 
he escaped from West Papua in a small plane with his 
wife and daughter in April 1988 [see 1'APOL Bulletin, 
No 88, August 1988J was arrested in Papua New Guinea 
in late ' July this year and tried for illegal entry, 
having crossed over into the country by foot from 
West Papua. He was given a two-month sentence with 
hard labour, which he is serving in Bomana Jail; Port 
Moresby. 
Another Swiss national, Patrick Francis Huber, was 
convicted for helping Frey and was fined K200. 
The court was told that Frey had flown an Austra~ 
lian-registered plane to a remote airstrip in West 
Papua from 'l'hursday Island on 31 July. There he off-
loaded camera equipment for use by others to make a 
fil~ a .bout c9nditions In . the i.riteri(;>E· < ..He ;i:~mained 
overnight in a nearby vill8.ge and · was · fote'nding to 
return to Australia the next day, but could not take 
off becaui:;~Jhe airstrip had becof!le water-logged and 
the plane could not take off.' 
According to PNG press reports, Frey fold the court 
he dec~ded to cross into PNG because he feared that 
he would be arrested and possibly shot, if caught by 
the. Indonesian authoritie~ •. lie .. r .7fy.sed to name lhe 
airstrip w;here he had left . the aircraft . for .teal' of 
retaliation against the local people. [Times .. 'ot Papua 
New Guinea and Niugini Nitts, 4 and 15 Augu~t 1989l* 
Price .£3.'iO (paJKrback) 
ISBN: 0 9'i06922 1 7 
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THE 1965 AFFAIR 
How Washington backed the 1965 massacres 
-~ta semint1r of the Jaklii"ta-based Centre for Strateg-
ic and international Studies to analvse the bfrth and 
the suz:vival powers of Suharto'; New Order, US 
llcadem1c Don Emmerson, commentinf( on the 1965 take-
over. ·:denied that the . US had gf.;en support to the 
operation 'to wipe out' the PKJ. He acknowledged 
howeve1· that at a time when Washington was having 
trouble captaining communism in Vietnam it was ~reatl! revit8lised by the achievements of the In-
donesian armed forces in crushing the PKI. " [Editor, 
2 September 1989/ 
A new book b .v Gabriel Kolkol has provided docum-
entar.v proof of America's role in those bloodthirsty 
events when an estim.'ited one million 'communist 
suspec:ts' wete killed. On the 24th anniversary of that 
°:ppallmg massacre, we publish the following extract 
in response to Emmerson's groundless 6Jaim. 
Indonesia. by late 1965 presented US strategv in 
Southeast Asia wfth a danger at least as gre~t as 
Vietnam at a. time when its preoccupation there made 
large-scale intervention in Indonesian impossible. The 
logic of the domino theory applied to it as much as to 
Vietnarot but its economic and strategic value was far 
greater. Relying on peaceful means, the PKI had 
grown consistently, and could be expected to continue 
to do so. The US had depended on the militarv since 
1919 to create a barrier to the Communists' and it 
understood well that Sukarno's skilled balance of 
contending forces to maintain his control would end 
in the near future with his .death. The events of 
September 30 created a small challenge but also an 
enormous opportunity to resolve America's dilemmas 
by directing the military's wrath against the Com-
munists. 
Th.e US embassy no later than 3. October thought the 
crucial issue was whether the army under Suharto 
wou~~ "have the fourage to go forward against [the l 
PKir an obsession they wen=~ to communicate to 
Washington over the next yays without disagreement 
from the State Departmeµt. l'here is no doubt either 
th.at they inf1:mmed key lndon~sjan . officers of their 
opinfons on the n.eed to destroy the PKI and. the 
l.atter had similar · thoughts even though thev too 
believed the . degree of PK! .culpability . was .. s~ill· very 
much a quest;ion. On October 5 the ar!XIY made the 
decision to "implement plans to crush [thel PKI," the 
ClA reported, without indicating when they had been 
drawn up. J With Sukarn9 and the PKI on the defen-
sive and Suharto's forces firmly 'in control and 
backed by the Muslims, the embassy cabled Washing-
ton, the arm;v : Gould move aga.inst the ~KI - "it's now 
or never". 4 Thr:ee days later, the first reports of 
attacks on PKI offices came in, with mainly Muslim 
youth acting with army encouragement. Marshall 
Green, who had been ambassador since June 1965, still 
worri~d .a.bout the military's "determination" to stand 
UJ;> to suka,rno but he was not .to be disappointed.5 
Indeed1 the military allowed Sukarno, ever the sup-
reme opportunist, to claim he was the head of state 
while they began the vast task of destroying the PKI, 
each seeking to use the otJ;ier. "We do think [the J army 
will go on trying, possibly not always as directly a.'s 
we would like, to keep matters moving in direction we 
would wish to see .. ," Green cabled Washington on 
Octop¢.r 14. ''Their success or failure is goinl!J to 
deter~ine our own in Indonesia for some time to 
come." By this point the embassy and the officers 
were often dit,;9'.ttssif!g ~Jv;:.ir nn~t.µa,l n~~cis ~nd plfins 
and there were no doubts whatsoever · that the US 
wished the army to act decisively • .. ·· • 
Reports of killings of alleged PKI members arrived 
at the embassy constantly, and its experts correctly 
concluded. that .the PKI, which was now being blamed 
for the events o( Septemhel" 30, was not likely to 
resist because it had long since ceased to be .revolu· 
tionar;v. Since the PKI had neither the arms nor the 
will to resist .• the tide of dest.ruction began to rise by 
lat~ October as mainly M.uslim and rightwing youth, 
with aiq from the army, began systematically tO, sweep 
the cities a~d countryside. Into their hands fell 
peasants who had asked fe>r lower rents and alienated 
their landlords, those who were apolitical and denotut-
ced by enemy settling grudges, PKI members and 
thpse wh9 w.efe yaguely lit'l.~ed to •• it, religious ele-
ments the M.Uslims disliked '- all suffered the same 
fa~ . -
Washington receiveci. all the details the embassy 
p9ssessed on. the army's support . for the massacre~ 
and. it took c;onsolation thti.t the army had resisted 
Sukarno's belated. efforts at the encf of OcJ:.ober to 
stop the slaught~r. The cleanup task would go on, 
(keel) told Rusk on October 28, and the next day, the 
secretary of state cabled back that "the campaign 
ag.!).inst PKI" must pontinue and that the militarv "are 
[the] only force capable of creating ord~r in In-
donesia" which they had to continue doing "with. or 
without Suk-rrno". Meanwhile, the generals could 
expect . U n.i,~ed States help . for a "major milit.-rry 
campaign against PKI" ,1 A week later Green reported 
back that while the army was aiding the Muslim youth 
in Java to take care .. of the PKI, .it was assuming the 
task directly in the outer islands, and it was con-
tei:nplatfog a military ' state in the future. We have 
"made .it clear that embassy and USG general}~ 
sympathetic with and admiring of what army doing." 
The army was wholly engaged, as Green described it 
several days later, .. a ... ttacking th .. e PKI "rut~lessly" •IL 
and "wholesale killings" were occurring. 9 .,. 
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It was in this context that the Indonesian generals 
early in November approached the US for equipment 
"to arm Moslem and nationalist youths in Central Java 
for use against the PKI ••• " Most were using knives 
and primitive means, and communications gear and 
small arms woµl<i expedite the killing. Since "elimin-
ation of these elements" was a precondition of better 
relations, the United States quickly promised covert 
aid, dubbed "medicines" to prevent .embarrassing 
revelations.10 At stake in the army's effort was the 
"destruction", as the CIA called the undertaking, of 
the PKI, and "carefully placed assistance which will 
help army cope with PKI" continued, as > Green descr-
ibed it, despite the many other problems in Indones-
ian-US relations that remained to be splved. 11 . 
The. "!~nal solution" to the Communis~ problem in 
Ipdonesill was cerlll.in1Y one 9f the most barbarig. acts 
of inhumanity in a century that has seen a great deal 
of it; it surely ra.11ks as a w~r criix)e of the same type 
as those the Nazis perpetrated. No single }\.merican 
action in the period ~fter 1945 was as bloodthirsty as 
its role ill Indonesia, for it tried to initi~te the 
massacre, and it did everything in its power to 
encourage Suharto, including . ~quipping his killers, to 
see that the physical liquiqation Of the P.f{I was 
carried through tq Jts culmination. Not a single one 
of its officials in Washington or Jakarta questioned 
the policy eith(lr pn ethical or political ground~; quite 
the contrary. "The :i;eversal of the Communist tide in 
LAND DISPUTES 
the great country of lndonesia." was publicly celebr-
ated; in the words of Deputy Undersecretary of State 
U. Alexis Johnson in October 1966, as "an event that 
will probably rank afong with the Vietnamese w~r ~s 
perhaps the most historic turninS\ P<?int of Asia m 
this decade. "12* 
1. Gabdel Kolko, Confrontillg the 1'bird World, US 
F'oz·eign Polic,v 1945-19,80, Pantheon Books, New York, 
1989. 
2. Cable . from Marshall Green, US ambassador to 
,:Jakarta, to De~n Rusk, 0Gt• 3 1965, R:607E, 
3: CIA, report, Oct.8,1965, R:2gA 
4. (}reen to DS, O<;t. 5 1965, R:698{t. 
5, Green to Rusk, 'OGt. 9, 1965 • . R:608E. 
(i. Ibid, Oct. 14, 1965, R:609A. 
7. Rusk to Green, Oct 29, .)965, R:612C. See also G1;een 
to Rusk, Oct. 17, 1965, ?:609C, Green to Rusk, Oct . . 28, 
1965, R:612A. 
8. Green to Rusk, Nov, 4, 1965, 2nd of 2 cables, 
79:134E. 
9 .. ibid, Nov~ 7, 1965, . R613A; ibid,. Nov. 8, 19.65, R:613E. 
10. Embass:v, Bangkok, to Rusk, Nov. 5, 1965, R:.612G. 
To flHlintain s~crecy, much .of the negotiations regard-
ing such aio were done in Banglrnk. Se.e also Rusk to 
embassies, Bangkok and Jakarta.1 Nov. 6, 1965,R:613B; 
Green to Rusk, Nov. 7, 1965, embassy, Bangkok, to 
Rusk, N0v. 11, 1965, R:614E. 
11. CIA, memo, Nov. 12, 1965, R::JOA; Green to . Rusk, 
Nov. 19, 1965, R:615D. 
12. DSB, Oct. 24, 1966, 640. 
World Bank springs another leak 
A leaked document prepared by a Bank Mission whk:h 
visited the Kedung Qmbo Dam for ll day!J in March 
this year, reveals that the Bank has resoz:ted to 
secrecy, prohibited by its own guidelines, in an 
attempt to resolve the Kedung Ombo dispute. 
Delaying. tactics 
De11pite. consistent oppo!JiUon from t.Qe oustees, t~ans­
migration remains central to the resettlement progra-
mme at l{edung On,ibo. To encourage more f~mili~s to 
transmigrate the Mi.i:;sion proposed that the seled.ion 
of participants for alternative activities in the dam 
area be d~layed until aboutmid-1990 when the re.set ... 
voir should be full again, because indiCations that the 
government was making special investments in · the 
reservqir area to enable all remaining families .. to 
obtain a sustainable livelihood, would be "counter-
productive to the transmigration campaign". ·· [The 
World Bank/ Resident Staff in lndonesia. Office 
Memorandum. April 14, 1989, l ' 
According to the Bank, transmigration is promoted 
as the best option because: "those that remain behind 
in the near vicinit,v of the reservoir are likel.v to 
have reduced income 1!1S occurred in the Saguling 
reservoir'': But this "reduced income" is not inevitab-
le; it is a. product of Bank and G9vernment incom-
petence in resettlement planning and reflec~s a lack 
ot commitment to finding viable alternatives to trans-
migration. 
~ ~ leaeon...but not apPbtnl it 79t 
A section entitled Lessons learned from Kedung Ombo 
Resettlement Experience Which Are Relevant To Future 
Bank Operations, recommends better consultation in 
resettlement planning, involving ''valid represen-
tatives of the population": the inclusiOn of all reset-
tlement costs in project costs; the use of NGOs as 
intermediaries between the · government and the 
displaced commun_ity, and finally, the need to addre.ss 
compensation problem$ "on a countrywide ba:sis" 
befOr~ proceeding With · the project. •A copy of this 
document was sent to Minister of the InteriClr General 
Rudil"li, wi.th a lett.er sugge~ting that "~ome significal)t 
improvements" could be made in compensation and in-
voluntary resettlement areas". 
In April 1988, a. consultant wa.s hired by the Bank 
to assess the resettlement and compensation at 
Kedung Omboi In his report, he l"eeommended that in 
return fol:' Government agreement to review its land 
acquisition and resettlement poliCies, the Ba:nk ·should 
continue to ''turn a blind eye" to · the fate of the 
families who had not accepted compensation. The 
Lessons Learned tell· the same story; · they a.re for 
future application, intended to prevent another 
Kedung Ombo from happening. Meanwhile, no reaj 
attempt is made to apply any of the principles to the 
current Kedung Ombo dispute, where according to a 
recent Kompas report, families are refusing to move to 
take up any .of the resettlement options on otter. The 
sites offered are too far away from their· land which 
remains , above the water level in the dam, while .. 
replacement land promised 1by the government has not., 
materialised. ·· [ Kompas, 23 Altgust 1989 I 
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options on offer. The sites offered are too far away 
from their land which remains above tne water level 
in the dam, while replacement land promised by the 
g~vernment has not materialised. f Kompas, 23/~/89] 
Cola{M!~Jl 
Tfle iP9'-dequ&te compEmsation has been central to the 
~edun,g Ombo dispute, 'l'he Bank's public explanation 
for this, is: 
Although the offered 18.nd compensation .rates paid 
were adjusted annually· by 10% to 15%, this inflation 
factor has, of course, not been adequate to allow 
fa1J1ilies which accepted or received compe(lsaUon 
especiall.v in the later years, tQ purcl)ase .land ofth~ 
same qua.Jit.v and quantit,v in the near vicinity of the 
reservoir. 
A letter fro.m >tfle a.ankto Dkector of Water Resources 
Soehf!;ndi Wirosoema.rto (30 March 1989), admits• that 
compensation was insufficient to penmit replacement 
of land lost, but contim1e.s: "·:· thi~ was not the 
intention of the compensation payments; compensati()n 
ws,s to be .co111plem~nted in mos.t .. cas~s by a trans-
migration package ..• '' Clearly, . the J~ank> .and . the 
Government never entertained the ideli of · resettling 
oustees on e<1l1iv~lent land near the dam. Only when 
it was realised . that th.e i:esiste.nce to transmigration 
a,nd the, r~jection. of th"'. compensat~on was .so stron,g 
al'ld. ~idespread, were. alternatives .consid~red. 
The le~ter also describes how the compen~tion .wa.s 
furthe.r reduced by taxation since 'the Japanese Exim 
Bank ~as involved in the funding, recommend~ng that 
this be reimbursed to the families, ~s " .. . it sel.'yes as 
an addition.al reason . for dissatisfaction with .. the 
compens~tiol'l process and has been interpreted . as an 
illegal deduction on the partof the local a,uthorities 
by _man;v of the c,qmpensated families ... ". · · 
~j 
The Bank's most recent set of guidelines on invohm-
tary resettlement stresses the importance of avoiding 
secrecy: 
LAND DISPUTES 
The victias of the Kedung Ollbo chm, clinging on t.o 
their rights, have been forCed to deViae new fora& of 
getting around. 
Dissemination ·of info~ma.ticm about the impendinl( 
reloca.tion, af)out the ~esettlers' righ.ts, . r:omperu~a.tion 
procedures, favours.bl(# choices ftc is an indffJ.pensable 
prt1mir;e for psrtlcipation anq requires an or84D.ise<J 
BJ'Btematic coinmunication mechanism. [Involu}'Jtary 
Resett~em.ent in ,Peyelop,:mmt1 frojec~s • .. Polley .. Guide .... 
linef! in Wqrld. ~ank ... FJnance<J,Projects Michael Cernea, 
1988, p l5J , . , 
the le~~d .. report re'V'eals · that tile Bank fails .to 
prtLQ~j~e Whl'lkit .Pl'~!'lche~·* 
In Cimf:i.can, West Java, farpers are fighting to prevent fertile land they have work~d for over 
fjO .,~a.rs . ft•ol!) . b<;Jcominf{ a.. poll course, despite an. order .· from the Interior Minister, Ge[J,eral 
Rudini for the project-to go ahead. Most . of the farmers have .. rejected the pittance ·.offered in. 
' . .. ' ,. 
compensa.tion. 
~turning tx> the land 
On August .19; after the property .. developers, .. PT BAM 
had started converting the · land, about 100 farmers 
took up their thoes and started to plant their crops 
on the 32-ha plot which yields three vegetable 
harvests a year . . Beside the official n,?tic.e of t~e 
company, the farmers put up ·a placard: This land is 
our life~. Let us farm it!" Journalists and r students 
witnessed the defiant farmers at work; while security 
guards.watched in the distance. [See Tapol Bulletin 94 
for background}. . ' 
Although the authorities have said that replacement 
land is being sought for those who have refused the 
compensation, most farmers are det~rmi~ed to. stay on 
the disputed land. The compensation is derisory. A 
"gift" of Rp 30 ,per square metre.has been offered to 
the Re.hrahan farmers - the land. is not theirs. so. they 
are not entitled to compensation, say the village 
authorities. The offer was rejected by the majority of 
t.he 200: farmers so the authorities resorted to force. 
A report .in SuaraPeDibaz·uan [21 August89ldescribes 
how the village secretary. and a primary se:hcx>l 
teacher took hold of one elderly villager and forced 
him to put his thumb print on an .acceptance of 
compensation document. Villagers who refuse.d to sign 
were told • that their children .will ,find it difficult to 
get jobs after they leave school. 
The village chief, Arifin, thought he could persuade 
the farmers to give up their land by .promising that 
the golf course will take them. on to work as caddies 
or. service personnel; the farmers · were unimpressed. 
The farmers have described how officials have made 
door-to--door visits to force them to accept compen ... 
sation, and h. ave u~ed. local reli.gious .leaders to •try to. 
influence, them. The farmers demanded .the cancellation 
of. PT BAM's contract, the return of the Rp 90 million 
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the company paid the village for the 30-year lease on 
the land, and the right to cultivate the land. 
The farmers refuse to stop planting their crops as 
the land is still disputed; they will stop only when PT 
BAM stops work on the golf course. 
Arrests 
At a meeting which villagers thought had been held 
to ascertain who was most entitled to the land, they 
questioned the effectiveness of the team set up to 
resolve the dispute, because it is dominated by the 
authorities. The meeting ended in disarray and more 
than 35 people, including students from Jogjakarta 
were arrested and held for several hours. 
The team has started to work, despite the protests. 
It has two wee]{s to come up with a settlement failing 
which the case will go through the courts. No farmer 
has ever won a legal battle against the government 
[Jakarta Post 2 September 89} 
The PD label 
The farmers base their claim on a 1961 government 
regulation that people who have been farming land for 
over 30 years can apply for a certificate. Their 
application was encouraged at the time by former 
village head Arifin, but he changed his mind when PT 
BAM show;ed an interest in ~e~sing the land. Arifin 
then denounced one of the farmers, Dudu, as ex-PKI 
and the farmers bid for a land certificate duly failed. 
It was Dudu who was tortured by PT BAM men ih 
September 1988. [See Ts.pol Bulletin 94] 
While it is of utmost importance that farmers gain 
recognition of their right to farm the land, it is also 
important not to lose sight of several basic issue. 
First, which is more important iri a poverty- stricken, 
overcrowded island - farming land or a golf course? 
When hundreds of thousands of Javanese are being 
shipped away because of the land squeeze, it is. ··f.hQ 
FORESTRY 
The upper board says that the far.ere• land iaay not be 
privately owned and has been rented to developers. The 
other l!laya "anyone refusing to take co•penaation and 
harv•l'lt their crops is obstructing develoJ)la•nt and 
opposing the /IJovern••nt". 
height of callousness to build a golf course on fertile, 
food-producing land. 
Second, the forest conservation coalition, SKEPHI 
argues that the land in question .. falls .~ithfo the 
buffer zone of the Cibodas National Park. Its use for 
a golf course, as part of a more ex~nsiye ce.ptre for 
tourism, would infringe decisions taken to, protect one 
of the few remaining tropical forests ill Jaya which 
safeguards the water ·catchment area. for Bogar, 
Jakarta, Cianjur and $ukabumi, from which the major 
rivEtrs .of West Java, . the Ciliwun~, Ctmandiri and 
Cisadane flow. By disrupting the existing balance 
'between pop\llation density, the farming actfvity now 
undertaken 'and the local production of timber for 
firewood, th.e tropicalforests would be under serious 
threat. SKEPHI has .. called · for broad. particip1.1.tion of 
the local population in assessing the environmental 
and social impact of the tourism project now . being 
promoted in the area.* 
Opposition to Scott gathers momentum 
The US-based paper transnational Scott is pressing 
ahead with plans to invest $650,000 in Merauke, West 
Papua for a eucalyptus plantation, wood-chipping mill 
and pulp plant project - Indonesia's biggest foreign 
investment in the non oil and gas sector to date. 
Together with Indonesian partner PT Astra, ~c::ott 
plans to cultivate 80,000 ha from a reserved area of 
around 520,000 ha (recently reduced Crom 790,000 ha} 
over ten years and a possible further 80,000 ha, after 
that. The wood-chipping mill (which Scott claims will 
not make a profit) will be fed by timber from the sites 
cleared for the eucalyptus, probably in the northern 
part of the concession area. The pulp mill is sched-
uled to begin opera.ling at a capacity of 1000 tons a 
day in 1999. So far 4 ha of land for a nursery and 
guest house have been acquired from one family and 
60 ha has been leased to Scott for the test plantation, 
This small area alone is the basis for the two year en-
vironmental and sociological impact study. 
·Scott has given repeated assurances to environmen-
tal and human rights groups that whether or not the 
project goes ahead is contingent on the successful 
outcome of the sociological and environmental impact 
assessments (SIA, EIA) expected to be finished by,the 
end of 1990. Under increasing pressure in areas 
where the company's mills are already: operating· -
there is a boycott of Scott products in Nova Scotia -
and .. watched closely by envi:r6n1TIEmtal groups ato\).nd 
the globe, Scott has opted for a conciliatory approach. 
It has met national and local NGO groups in Indonesia 
and has sent a West Papuan anthropologist (acco-
mpanied by a Scott employee l to tour villages in the 
project area and "inform" the po'Pculation aoout the 
project. · · ' ' 
S~pticislll 
But Indonesian NGOs doubt that discussioJHl with 
Scott and the Indonesian g-0vetnment will amount .to 
much more than a PR exercise. ·They have seen how 
up to now "development" .has ( marginalised the in-
digenous people of West Papua: 
·One NGO member active in Merauke .sa.vs that so(ar 
the effects u1·bsnisation on local tribes has been 
devastating and that the.v hiive not ;vet shown the 
abilft.Y to survive a cash econom.l'. "People there might 
accept change ph,vsicall;v, but culturall.v and mentall,Y 
they will be wiped .out. II (Environesia June 1989). 
No NGOs were informed , or consulted about the land 
already acquired . for , the'. project, ' despite Scott's 
commitment to involving NGOs. When asked recently 
how much Scott had paid for the land, project direc:_ ... 
tor Barry, Kotek's memory failed him, saying it was., 
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"substantially more" than the legally required amount. 
N.GOs are scep.tical too that recommendations they 
have submitted for the terms of reference of the SIA, 
for involvement of local people at every stage will be 
genuinely taken into consideration. 
Having to face Scott's well-oiled public relations 
ma.chine is bad enough; NGOs who dare question the 
style of President Suharto's development tco vocifer-
ously must fear for their continued existence. Under 
renewed pressure, (see separate article), NGOs have 
felt obliged to tone down outright opposition to any 
project which heralds environmental devastation and 
social dislocation. 
Despite these constraints, there have been calls in 
Indonesia for a worldwide boycott of Scott products 
(best known a.re Andrex toilet paper and Scotties tis-
sues) and demands .. for community participation with 
no pressure from the military or goyernment officials. 
But forestry conservation network $KEPH1 is not 
optimistic: "Public ·· participation is not a favourite 
issue in Indonesia. In the past 22 years public 
participation has .virtually been non-existent in this 
country" .( Setialrnwan No 1, July-August 1989). 
For the dominant tribal group ih the reserved area, 
.the Auwyu, the same pressures apply. Papuans have 
never been consulted about development proj.ects, 
including transmigration and there is little likelihood 
that Scott's "information" tour of remote villages 
involves genuine consultation. A declaration of 
support for the government's development programme, 
bearing the stamps of military and police ':'"itr'lesses", 
was signed by civil ... servants posing as '"represe-
ntatives" of the Auwy\.1. The real representatives -
the. traditional tribal leaders - did not sign. 
Scott has promised to respect "traditions which 
protect the land-owning rights of the people". How-
ever, these can be legally violated at any time by the 
Jndonesian government. Regulations state that in the 
interests of national development, adat law is subor'-
dinate .to nationallaw meaning that tribal land can be 
appropriated for development projects. Still, the 
Indonesian Government is taking a · more subtle ap-
proach and has recommended that the acquisition 
p.rocess respect tribal rights "as lar as possible". A 
Ministry of Population and Environment document 
suggests even that Scott should explore a method "in 
which tribes have still some right on the land". This 
reflects Indonesia's recent defensive attitude on 
tribal issues. Fierce cr.iticism from abroad prompted 
the government to stage a European tout of Asmat 
culture in an attempt to convince the world that 
Indonesia's tribal people are well-treated, while at 
home, tribal resettlement policies continue unchanged. 
Poor pollution pert<)rJMnee . . . 
Scott to<>, has its own reputation to consider. The 
company was recently ranked>second worst in a pollu-
tion performance surve;v of fifteen !)aper co!Il.panies 
by the highly respected US-based Council on Econo-
mic Priorities. According to the CEP report, Scott, 
"not a shining example of an environmentally respon-
sible company" refused to provide data for assess-
ment purposes. Last year the Gan~d~tln gqvernrnent 
threatened to take Scott to court unless it provided 
information Ort t'!ffluent prodvc~(i at its . Cana.dian 
operations. Scott has also . paid fines for ... violating 
health regulations in Canada. In the remote Digu1 
River region ofWest Papua, it willbe easier for Scot.t 
to get away with environmental anP, health violations 
and harder for people to gain access to information . 
. .. ·:, ·"·, ~ .{'. ·.: ' '.' - . 
Land negotiations . . 
Scott has said that land negotiations are being 
conducted on a "clan by clan basis". At a recent 
meeting in London with Suryival International and 
FORESTRY 
JAYAWIJAY,A 
The s~ded area re1>resents the huge region 
been handed over to /lstra-Scott Cellulosa for eucalyp-
tu13 l)lantations, industri,ai in,stallations and 1,.nfra-
structure. If Scot't goes ahead, roads will also criss-
cross the area, destroying irreplacable rainforests. 
Frfonds of the Earth 1 company director Kotek con'-
fiimed that all land in the concession may be covered 
by ownership rights but explained that not all of this 
land was used - and this land could be used to make 
up the "patchwork" of eucalyptus plantations. 
When pressed on the all-important question of 
whether Scott would pull out if the people were 
opposed to the project, Kotek replied: 'Absolutely! ... 
Our principle is that it won't work if the people 
aren't with us." He then qualified this, saying ''it's 
not a black and white issue" and admitted that he 
saw no practicable way of assessing whether or not 
people were in favour of the project. 
Before the London meeting, Scott had invited US-
based environmental groups for talks and then used 
this al'! publicity to fofluence public opinion, claiming 
to have "invited the leadership of the Rainforest 
Action Network .. to participate in the process". RAN 
p+omptly .denourn:;edScott's statement.as "misleading", 
reiterating their conviction tha.t the project "will be 
a cornerstone in the Indonesi.an government's cam-
paign to colo[liz~ s{>arsely tn.ha~ited Irian Jaya •• ". 
't~sm.igratif>n ~d local labou~ .......... · . . . . . • . 
196,000 families are due to be settled in W.est Papua in 
the current five year economic plan - almost one 
million people - in a country where the indigenous 
people number less than a million. Some of these 
transmigr!Jnts will be settled nea:r:' the Scott conces-
sion as part of the regional development strategy. 
Indeed their resettleme~t may dependon Scott going 
ahead with the .project. According to the Mini~try of 
Population and Envi:ronment: 
The p1•o}ect si:zould be seen ss sn integral part of 
regional development, with the project as the major 
pull factor. [M. inistry of Population and .Environmentlll 
statement on PT Astra-Scott Cellulosa project, April 6, .. 
1989] . 
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Further evidence of the link between the project and 
transmigration comes in a 1988 UNDP report on re-
gional development which reveals that the initial idea 
was to feed the pulp mill with timber from eucalyptus 
plantations on transmigration sites. The project which 
would employ 4,000 workers " ... can only be implemen-
ted in conjunction wi th the ... transmigration program-
me ... " (Government of Indonesia/UNDP RegionaLDevel-
opment Planning for Jl'ian Js.va. Vol 2, June 1988) • ... 
One year later, Scott is stressing its commitment to 
using indigenous labour. According to Kotek at the 
London meeting, President Suharto and Irian Jaya 
Governor Bas Suebu have emphasised the need for 
local labour to be employed by the project. Scott has 
said that "as many as possible" local people who want 
to work for the project will be g.iven jobs and has 
already employed 30 local people on the test plot. 
But Kotek does not deny that transmigrant labour 
will be used. PT Astra, Scott's partner, is less reti-
cent, stating that "additional labour" will be brought 
in in cooperation with the M.inistry of Transmigration 
and that "facilities to accommodate the influx of 
people will be constructed according to Ministry of 
Transmigration standards''. Transmigrants already 
make up one seventh of Mcrauke's population, ~o~t1y 
in the southern part of the district. Kotek v1s1ted 
transmigration sites in Merauke and stated that 
tra.nsmigrants Ii vln g in this "etonomic wastelan?" 
knew about the project and were eager to work for it. 
Together with the arrival -:>f new trans migrants, thfs 
means that competition for jobs wm be formidable. 
Scott naively believes it cr.f'\ control enough land to 
prevent transmigrant settlements encroaching into 
parts of the "reserved area" which the company 
claims will be, left in a natural state. If transmigrants 
do move into the area, and it seems certain they will, 
the resource base of the local people will be severely 
reduced a.nd their marginalisation assured. 
Further encroachments into the reserved area over 
and .above the plantations and transmigration are 
inevitable: according to PT Astra, 100 km of roads per 
ye.s.r will be constructed and three satellite towns in 
addition to Bade will be needed. 
The reasons why this project should not go ahead 
are manifold: eucalyptus has been exposed as en-
vironmentally and socially disruptive in other parts 
of the world; rare species or plarit and animal life are 
threatened with extinction, and more forests will die. 
The influx. of official transmigrants a.nd unofficial 
migrants will displace and impoverish the indi~enous 
people of the Digul basin, turning them i nto a minori-
ty in their own land.* 
Bob Hasan declares war 
Timber tvcoon Bob Hasan has declared war on Western 
coneer~~tionists who criticize forest destruction in 
Indonesia by ·spending US ~2 million on a two year 
advertising and lobbying campaign in the US 4nd 
Europe. Hasan showed a copy of a full-page advert 
which appeared in The New York Times, 18 August 
1969, to Malaysian Primary .Resources Minister .Lim 
Keng Yaik, boa.sting ·that it had cost $46,000. The ad 
declares that "Indonesia has always recognized the 
unique natural resource with which it was blessed"; 
it cites parks and reserves, · "strict harvest],ng 
regulations" and tough 4ction against logging com-
panies who violate them as means of ensuring that 
"Indonesia will have tropical forests for ever", while 
attacking environmental groups who "want Indonesia 
managed as one big protected park". 
Lim Keng Yaik had come to Jakarta to discuss how 
Indonesia and Malaysia could best cooperate i,n their 
joint campaign to counter the conservationists. They 
will lobby the US and Europe for support of their 
security fore•• confiacattng the banner unfurled in 
front of the US .. baaay last Hay. protesting against 
the destruction of Indonesia rainforests by US aulti-
nationala. 
timber products and have agreed , to marke't -.jointly 
sawn timber products to prevent buyers depressing 
the prices. 
The rosy picture painted by Hasan is not supported 
by '1. confidential repor;t on Indonesia's forests by the 
World Bank: ''Resources such as forests; lsnd and 
water are .now becoming scarce and must be managed 
more effectively if the benefits derived . from such 
resources are to be sustained." The Bank estimates 
current destruction at 1,000,000. hectares a year and 
a loss , of at least one billion dollars a year from 
inefficient' use of forest land, poor logging methods 
and -fire. Logging companies w.ere accused of felling· 
trees ineptly, returning to logged areas too soon and 
.misreporting their harvests. [Reuters, 29August19891* 
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East Timor, the inside story 
Two tourists from Sweden, Jan-Erik Forsberg and Eva 
Vanglund, armed with cameras and tape-recorders, 
decided during a trip to Indonesia to make a ten-day 
visit to East Timor in May this year. Taking full 
advantage of the chance for tourists to go to East 
Timor under Jakarta's policy of 'openness', they 
travelled to the eastern part of the country, only to 
discover, as Forsberg said in a statement to the UN 
Sub-Commission on Human Rights three months later, 
that East Timor is "a country at war and a nation still 
living under foreign occupation". 
Iva Vanglund and Jan-Erik Forsberg at the UH to lobby 
the Sub-Commission about East Timer. [Photo: Carmel 
Budiardjo. The other photos are by Jan-Erik Forsberg.] 
Permit 
The permit they received in Jakarta mentioned only 
Dili and they were given names of places in the east 
that they would not be allowed to visit, including 
Natarbora, Los Palos, Baucau and Viqueque. In Dili, 
the police seemed unaware of this and did not pre-
vent them from taking the bus to Baucau after 
several days in the capital. In Baucau, they found 
that thev were also able to travel on to Viqueque. 
This sug.gests that some authorities in East Timor are 
less concerned than others to limit access to the more 
sensitive areas of the country. 
In Dili, they stayed at Hotel Dili, avoiding the 
Tourismo and Resende hotels which are bristling with 
security agents. Even so, they received daily visits 
from immigration and tourism officials. They were able 
to shake off attempts to organise their Itinerary but 
other hotel guests received a visit from someone 
called William Blake who said he works for Sospol; he 
invited them to dinner and bought them bus tickets. 
'Sospol' is the social and political section in all 
government offices always headed by army intel-
ligence agents and responsible for security matters 
(basically, the political commissar). 
A different D1ll 
Regarding their stay in Dili, Forsberg told the UN 
Sub-Commission: 
Our first impressions seemed to confirm the picture 
painted b;v the authorities. We had been told that East 
Timor was now peaceful, safe and developing. In Dili 
we saw new buildings, a modern sports arena and 
well-kept streets. But we also found a different Dili 
where (Timorese) live in povert.v in huts and shacks 
on the other side of a dried-up river. We talked with 
people there and with students from the San Jose 
school and asked, was there any resistance and what 
they thought about integration. Our questions were 
met with both sympathy and fear ... 'I understand why 
you are asking bu,v I can't say anything. 1 
When they took the bus to Baucau, the identity 
cards of all Timorese passengers had to be handed 
over to a conductor. Each time the bus stopped at 
security checkpoints, three times from Baucau and 
three times from Baucau to Viqueque, the conductor 
reported to the post and all cards were checked. 
As they neared Baucau, the army's presence became 
more conspicuous. At Laleia heavily-armed soldiers 
were repairing a bridge destroyed only three years 
ago; four were on guard while two worked. 
As for Baucau, it "looked like a city at war". At the 
airport, they saw armoured personnel carriers, 
helicopters and heavily-armed soldiers in combat 
uniform. Indeed, as Forsberg later told TAPOL, 
virtually all the soldiers they saw were carrying 
automatic weapons and wearing combat fatigue. 'the 
only place to stay was Flamboyant Hotel, which forl 
years has been used by the paras regiment as an 
A security checkpoint outside Dili. rorsbers took this 
photo fr0ta inside the bus takinl th .. to Baucau. 
interrogation and torture centre. It is now being 
refurbished tor use as a hotel again. [The Swedes 
later learnt that the interrogation centre in Baucau 
has now been shifted to somewhere near the airfield.] 
What struck the travellers on their wav from Baucau 
to Viqueque was the huge tracts ot iand that are 
devoid ot population and uncultivated. This was 
formerly an important rice-growing region. 
Their stay in Viqueque coincided with the Muslim 
holiday, Idul Fitri, and a visit by armed forces 
commander-in-chief, General Try Soetrisno. Taking 
Forsberg for a visiting journalist, the general shook 
hands with him and allowed him to take close-ups. 
"School-children had been mobilised to greet him but 
there were very few adults and they didn't seem to 
share the excitement of the children," Forsberg later 
told the UN Sub-Commission. 
Military operations 
Viqueque, they discovered, is a city surrounded by 
armed resistance fighters with troops constantly on 
the move. When they asked about the massive military 
On the road to Liuhunu. An Indonesian soldier proudly 
poses with his weapon, as he guards others at work. 
presence, they were told the troops were needed for 
development. "In the evenings however [they spent 
four nights in Viqueque], we heard grenade-shelling 
from the surrounding hills and in the mornings we 
saw trucks returning full of soldiers who were 
covered in mud." 
In discussion with Timorese and Indonesians, 
civilian and military, they pieced together invaluable 
information about local, on-going military operations. 
While Fretilin fighters are believed to be organised 
in five units, each ot two companies, or about 500 
people, the Indonesian army has three or four bat-
talions in the city (more than 3,000 men) plus a 
reconnaissance unit of Timorese called Team Makatit, 
or the Hawk Team, whose commander is known as 
Lafargue or The Crocodile. Besides combat battalions 
and a battalion of territorial troops, there are para-
commandos, Timorese civil defence troops (hansip) and 
a Timorese army unit, Battalion 744. In other words, 
Indonesian troops outnumber resistance fighters by 
at least s!x to one. One informant told Forsberg that 
the Fretilin arm themselves by ambushing army units, 
killing the troops and running oft with their weapons. 
The hansips carry inferior weapons as they are 
suspected of pro-Fretilin sentiments with a disposi-
tion to defect, taking their weapons with them. 
With Fretilin forces on the outskirts, the city is 
ringed by military posts, making a huge circle to 
defend the city from Fretilin attacks. Local civilian 
inhabitants (not hansips) are required to remain on 
guard at these posts nightly; they each must do 
guard-duty for seven consecutive nights while the 
soldiers sleep, ready for combat on the following day. 
A similar situation exists in nearby Lakluta where, 
as Forsberg was told, two men on guard-duty were 
shot dead last October. 
Returning to Dili from Viqueque, Forsberg and 
Vanglund spent one night at the police station in 
Ossu. One wall was covered by a huge board with 
statistics showing how people voted at the 1987 
elections, the property and cattle they owned,· the 
regional voting patterns, and so on. 
Fretnin-held terrlt.or7 
According to several of their sources, Fretilin 
forces have launched a number of attacks recently. In 
July 1987, they attacked Viqueque, Meli-Meloi, killing 
two soldiers and destroying several houses. In 
December 1987, they attacked Monumento, south of 
Viqueque, burning down houses and capturing food, 
while in late 1988 and early this year, they mounted 
several attacks on Uaimur, north of Viqueque. 
Although as Forsberg discovered, many people in 
Viqueque have close relatives fighting in the bush, 
they never dare to express support for the resis-
tance, for fear of being arrested or worse. 
According to several well-informed contacts, Fretilin 
forces control the surrounding mountains and forests, 
turning these into areas which the Indonesian troops 
are not able to penetrate. While most civilians are 
confined to army-supervised villages, there are also 
civilians in the interior with the resistance. 
Concentration camps tor villaaea 
Villagers in the district, Forsberg was told, continue 
to live in concentration camps and are prevented from 
going more than five kilometres beyond the camp 
perimeter. Violators are suspected of making contact 
with the resistance since the army is convinced that 
these areas are under Fretilin control. 
Marina super-11&.rket in Dili, an outlet for the aray-
run company, PT Denok. 
"Here, we are concentrated in Viqueque," said one 
informant. "There, over those mountains, there is no 
population, only Fretilin, according to the army. 
Anyone going more than 5 kme could, they suspect, 
be getting information from Fretilin or telling them 
how to attack Indonesian positions. Much of the land 
which is out-of-bounds is fertile and is not under 
cultivation, hence the shortage of food. Anyone 
wishing to go, say, to Bibiliao to plant or harvest 
crops must go in a group of ten to thirty people and 
return to Viqueque the same day." 
Before setting out, the local military command 
( kodim) or NCO ( babinsa) must inform the battalion 
commander that a group will be going to gather food. 
They go under military escort with troops in front 
and in the rear. Only a month ago, Forsberg was told, 
two people were shot dead because they went out to 
gather food without permission. 
Health conditions and the war 
Forsberg also learnt about the very inadequate 
medical services facilities in Viqueque. Infant mor-
tallty is high because of the prevalence of tuber-
culosis and a high incidence of stomach disorders, as 
well as tropical diseases. Doctors are few and far 
between and as many as sixty localities in the district 
do· not have a single nurse. The doctors who come to 
East Timer are young graduates with no experience 
and little interest in helping Timorese. 
[Confirming this account with some alarming statis-
tics of his own, Mario Carrascalao, the governor of 
East Timor, recently told a team of Indonesian MPs 
who visited Dili that 70 per cent of Timorese suffer 
from tuberculosis, while only forty out of the sixty-
one sub-districts in East Timor have a doctor. (Jakar-
ta Post, 5 August 1989) 
In areas where military operations are under way, 
there is an added obstacle to medical care, high-
lighted by an incident described to Forsberg in 
Viqueque. An army intelligence unit out on recon-
naissance to discover Fretilin positions came across a 
stock of medicine and drew the conclusion that it had 
been supplied by nearby villagers. This led to house-
to-house searches; anyone found to be in possession 
of medicines was arrested and taken to kodim for 
interrogation. Since then, nurses at the local health 
centre have been afraid to issue medicine to anyone, 
lest they are suspected of hoarding up medicines to 
send to the fighters in the bush. 
Birth control 
One constant bone of contention for the Timorese 
people is the government's family planning program-
me. The Swedish visitors were left in no doubt about 
the strong resistance to this programme, primarily, as 
they were told, on religious grounds. They learned 
that the people who are most vulnerable to pressure 
are T1morese military personnel and civil servants. 
"Their commanders and superiors are all Indonesians, 
mostly from Java and they have no-one to protect 
them against family-planning exhortations." Moreover, 
these people only receive child allowances for the 
first three children. 
Discrimination and culture 
Visiting localities like Baucau and Viqueque gave the 
Swedish tourists a unique insight into the education 
system and cultural discrimination. First, they were 
told by people connected with local schools that 
although almost all teachers in the primary schools 
are Timorese and hence Tetum speakers, they must do 
all their teaching in Indonesian. Tetum may not be 
used or spoken at school. Army officials frequently 
visit the schools to make sure that everyone speaks 
Indonesian. This is part of what they proudly boast 
of as their "social-political role". At lower and upper 
secondary schools, most teachers are Indonesian. 
Besides language teaching, history is the subject 
most directed towards making school-children 'think 
like Indonesians'. The two Swedes saw school walls 
adorned with pictures of Indonesian leaders and were 
told that the history curriculum is called Pelajaran 
Sejarah Per juangan Bangsa or the History of the 
National Struggle (Indonesian, not Timorese). 
The one place where Tetum may officially be used is 
in church. The Vatican has authorised a Tetum 
version of the mass and it is now widely celebrated in 
that language. [No agreement was reached, however, 
over a proposal that the Pope celebrate mass in Tetum 
when he makes his three-hour visit to East Timor on 
12 October. He may therefore say it in Latin with a 
translation into Indonesian.) Timorese priests who are 
occasionally invited to celebrate mass in Indonesian 
find that few Timorese come to their services. 
There are not enough secondary schools to absorb 
children who complete primary education. Nearly 1,400 
children will be finishing their primary school educa-
tion this year in Viqueque but there are only 7 
schools to absorb them. (A reasonable calculation 
might be a total of forty new entrants per school.) 
Moreover, most of the available places will be taken 
by Indonesian children. There are far more secondary aJ 
schools in Dili but here too, Indonesian children are., 
assured places while Timorese children a r e not. 
Various methods are used to swing entry in favour of 
Indonesian children. Most discriminatory of all is the 
fact that school reports and grades a r e not enough ; 
children are required to sit entry tes t s , in Indones-
ian, to the detriment of Timor ese c hild ren. 
"Ara7 strikes fear" , 8&78 journalist 
Freelance r Da n ny Gittings wrote, afte r a week 's visit 
to East Timor in June , t hat "fear and tension are still 
widely apparent in this t roubled tropical enclave", 
Visi tors to .. . Dili now see a pleasant, well-ordered 
towll, apparently untouched by fighting, where the 
avsilability of western consumer goods gives a hint 
of newly-found prosperity . However two-thirds of 
East Timor is located east of Dili and a week-long 
journey through these areas on local buses produced 
a very different picture of life in the enclave. The 
military presence rapidl.v became more apparent. 
In Los Palos, he was warned not to travel out of 
town after dark because of guerri11a activity. It was 
* I 
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A typical sight in Baucau, where soldiers in •ilitary 
fati1ues are everywhere to be seen. 
difficult to find anyone to drive him farther east to 
Tutuila because the region was regarded as danger-
ous. When someone did agree, he posted a look-out on 
the roof to watch for guerrillas. 
Like many villages in the remoter areas of East 
Timor, today's Tutuila is a modern settlement built on 
high ground - in this case seaside cliffs - as part of 
a government resettlement scheme to isolate the locals 
from the rebels. A villager said they were forcibly 
evicted from its former site ... in 1982 and those who 
refused to move were killed. Amid the ruins of the old 
Tutuila, only gravestones could still be seen standing, 
a sight almost as common as houses in this part of the 
enclave, and a sombre reminder of the huge number 
of victims during the 14-year connict. 
A young man he met in a restaurant loudly extolled 
the benefits Indonesian rule had brought. "But later, 
in a deserted barn away from prying eyes, the same 
Timorese worker added a ... cautionary footnote: 
' Indonesia has brought us many good things but we 
a r e all still afraid of her army." ["Army still strikes 
A wayside stall on the way to Area Branca, Dili. Here, 
says Forsberg, the people greet you in Portuguese. 
fear in villages", South China Morning Post, 12 August 
1989.] 
In another article, Gittings said there are still an 
estimated 10,000 Indonesian troops stationed in Ea.st 
Timor. 
Their presence is all pervasive. The military domi-
nates the local econom.v and frequent arm.v check-
points are strung all along the main roads. Signs of 
war can be seen almost ever.vwhere. In some areas, 
patrols of wary soldiers were to be seen moving 
slowly in the bush, their guns at the ready. Indone-
sian civilians appeared uneasy travelling in East 
Timor, often advising against travel after dark. 
A minibus full of villagers and lively teenage girls 
fell suddenl.v silent when a soldier, dressed in combat 
fatigues and clutching his rifle, climbed aboard. 
Several people said the.v were worried about being 
interrogated by military intelligence simply for 
talking to a foreigner. 
Gittings also met deputy governor, Lieutenant-
Colonel A.B. Saridjo (who has a long career of military 
and civilian jobs in Ea.st Timor), who confirmed that 
villagers are still being re-settled away from areas of 
guerrilla. activity "to provide better security for 
them". ["No end to a long- hidden suffering", in The 
Scotsman, 28 August]* 
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